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Abstract 
 
This dissertation presents three essays on retirement and savings behaviour. It relies 
on secondary data from British national surveys to empirically address how workers 
prepare and adapt to the economic circumstances of later life. 
Chapter 1 analyses the effectiveness of providing workers with the opportunity to 
join workplace pension schemes to stimulate pension savings. It estimates the potential 
opt-in rate among employees who haven’t been offered a pension plan by an employer, had 
they been offered the opportunity to join a scheme. Governmental policies enforcing 
pension plan provision at every workplace could generate a major impact on aggregate 
participation rates. This potential success does not seem to be conditional on the existence 
of mechanisms imposed by law concerning the way workers are enrolled. 
Chapter 2 examines the effect of workplace pension schemes provision and 
participation on other individual financial savings, such as personal pension plans and 
financial assets. It exploits the variability in workplace pension scheme provision and 
membership induced by the employer’s payroll size as an identification strategy. No 
evidence is found that providing employees with access to workplace pension schemes 
would make them less likely to save through non-pension financial instruments. These 
results support the enforcement of the universal provision of workplace pension schemes 
as a national policy to improve financial preparation for retirement. 
Chapter 3 builds on the literature of the economic role of home production of goods 
and services at retirement. The literature usually restricts the explanation of retirees’ 
heterogeneous attitudes towards home production to gender differences or social norms 
related to couples’ division of labour. The present study provides novel evidence that non-
cognitive skills in the form of personality traits explain the heterogeneous reallocation of 
time and consumption that occurs during a transition from the labour market to retirement.  
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Introduction 
 
Developed countries were the first to face the consequences of the ageing 
population on governmental expenditures on social security. Lower labour market 
participation and deteriorated health conditions might turn the elderly into vulnerable 
group in the absence of appropriate income security. For this reason, multi-pillared pension 
systems modalities have been proposed (World Bank, 1994; OECD, 2006; Holzmann, 
2000, 2012; Holzmann et al, 2008; Willmore, 2000; Davies, 2013) to support societies in 
two primary goals: 
i. Mitigate the risk of elderly poverty; and  
ii. Smooth consumption from work life into retirement. 
State-provided cash benefits form the first pillar of old-age income security. They 
are often funded in a “pay-as-you-go” basis by national insurance contributions and 
general tax revenues. Hence, the sustainability of a national public pension system is 
conditional on the existence of a not very high number of retired people as a share of those 
of working age who are actually contributing - the old age dependency ratio. This 
adequacy is unlikely in more developed countries, especially due to their higher life 
expectancies.  
Currently, public pensions form the major part of old-age income security in most 
European Union member states. However, a second pillar composed by “fully funded” 
pension plans is also relevant. For example, Sweden, the Netherlands, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom have reformed their pension systems to stimulate retirement savings 
through voluntary/mandatory occupational pension plans to supplement the public 
statutory benefit. Due to the increasing adoption of fully funded pension systems, much of 
the responsibility for old-age income provision has moved from governments’ budgets to 
households’ finances. This led to a sharp increase in workers’ required level of awareness 
about how much to save for retirement and how to allocate pension wealth (Lusardi, 2008). 
Additionally, most employers offering occupational schemes have substituted the provision 
of defined benefit plans for defined contribution plans, mainly to mitigate balance sheet 
exposures to fund imbalances.  As a consequence, financial literacy interventions have 
been used as tools for enhancing individuals’ downstream financial behaviour (Fernandes 
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et al, 2014; Miller et al, 2015), to counteract the increasing complexity of sophisticated 
products and the facilitated access to credit (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). 
Aiming to overcome behavioural barriers to retirement savings such as 
procrastination and inertia (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1998), some pensions systems 
have meanwhile tried to transform workplace pension schemes into simpler and more 
automatic instruments. For example, the United Kingdom established universal provision 
of workplace pension plans with matching contributions by all employers and the 
automatic enrolment of eligible employees into these schemes. This reform was supported 
by a body of evidence in behavioural sciences which suggests that when workers are 
defaulted to join occupational pension schemes, participation rates are higher than if they 
had made the standard decision whether to opt in (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 
2006; Benartzi and Thaler, 2013).  
While default choices are expected to effectively boost workplace pension plans’ 
participation, their effect on overall savings and its consistency with the public’s 
preferences is still ambiguous. For example, an increase in workplace pension savings 
could be funded by a reduction in the amount households would save in other forms 
(Crawford et al, 2012). Also, letting employees actively decide (Carrol et al., 2009; 
Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004; Keller et al, 2011) whether to opt-in to a company’s scheme 
might be preferred to “one-size-fits-all” impersonal defaults when individual 
characteristics are very heterogeneous or when government interventions (Sunstein and 
Thaler, 2003) are infeasible, undesirable or unethical (Sunstein, 2013; Arad and 
Rubinstein, 2015). A recent literature highlights that public policy should account for 
different levels of individual choice autonomy to enhance the adequacy of economic 
decisions (see Felsen et al., 2013; Arad and Rubinstein, 2015; Hagman et al., 2015). In this 
sense, a prudent policymaker might consider a society’s views and perceptions on the use 
of libertarian-paternalistic mechanisms, for example, default options, and how the 
government should intervene in individuals’ decision-making (Sunstein, 2015; Reisch and 
Sunstein, 2016; Jung and Mellers, 2016). 
The World Bank’s framework to assess pension systems and reform options 
(Holzmann et al, 2008) also considers a “non-financial pillar”. Among other non-financial 
endowments, it includes access to informal family and friends support, and other formal 
social programs, such as health care or housing (Holzmann et al, 2008). Studies on the 
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economic role of home-production at retirement (e.g. Hurst, 2008; Luengo-Prado and 
Sevilla, 2013) suggest that retirees devote more time than workers to economically 
rewarding “do-it-yourself” housework tasks, for example preparing meals at home and 
doing laundry, in order to substitute market goods and services that they would, otherwise, 
have to pay for. As a consequence, a prudent evaluation of retirement savings adequacies 
and the mechanisms through which the ageing population cope with finances should reflect 
that an individual’s ability to produce goods and services at home is part of her life-time 
wealth. 
Considering this multi-pillared pension system modalities, the intent of this 
dissertation is to addresses workers’ preparation and adaptation to the economic 
circumstances of retirement. It is comprised of three empirical studies, presented in 
different chapters, which rely on secondary data from British national longitudinal surveys, 
such as the British Household Panel Survey (University of Essex, 2010) and the Wealth 
and Assets Survey (Office for National Statistics, 2016). Chapter 1 analyses the 
effectiveness of providing workers with the opportunity to join workplace pension schemes 
to stimulate pension savings. Chapter 2 examines the effect of workplace pension schemes 
provision and participation on other individual financial savings, such as personal pension 
plans and financial assets. Chapter 3 builds on the literature of the economic role of home 
production of goods and services at retirement to show that non-cognitive skills in the form 
of personality traits explain the heterogeneous reallocation of time devoted to domestic 
chores and consumption that occurs during a transition from the labour market to 
retirement. To conclude the dissertation, Chapter 4 provides a summary of the analysis, its 
overriding concluding remarks and implications for public policy and for future 
investigation. 
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Chapter 1 
Participation in workplace pension schemes and the effect 
of provision 
 
Default choices and price subsidies have been suggested as public policy 
mechanisms to promote individual financial preparation for retirement via workplace 
pension schemes (Choi et al, 2006; Beshears et al., 2009; Chetty et al, 2014; Benartzi and 
Thaler, 2013). The reform initiated in the United Kingdom from October 2012, established 
by the 2008 Pensions Act, is a real application of such mechanisms at a national level. For 
example, it has not only stipulated mandatory matching contributions by employers 
(Madrian, 2012) and automatic enrolment of all workers (Madrian and Shea, 2001), but 
also imposed a universal duty on companies to provide such plans within the workplace. 
Nevertheless, estimates of the effect of workplace pension schemes provision on aggregate 
membership rates are currently absent. The existing literature on the determinants of 
savings and on who saves for retirement conventionally analyses saving behaviour of 
workers who have been offered a pension scheme within the workplace – the so called 
eligible workers (Bryan et al, 2011; Bryan and Lloyd, 2014). This study aims to fill this 
gap by estimating how the opportunity to join a workplace pension scheme is to impact 
overall pension plan participation.  
The British reform is expected to be fully implemented by 2018, when workplace 
pension plans provision will be universally mandatory for employers. As a result, the 
isolated policy effect of provision of workplace pension schemes will no more be possibly 
disentangled from the reform’s entire effect, which contains other mechanisms, for 
instance mandatory automatic enrolment and matching contributions. These facts make the 
British case an advantageous source of evidence to inform future policymaking 
internationally. In this sense, we use British longitudinal data from a period when the 
decision to provide a scheme was still a decision of the employer (1992-2009), i.e. not 
mandatory according to the 2008 Pensions Act. In sum, we estimate the potential opt-in 
rate among those workers who haven’t been offered a plan, had they been offered a scheme 
by the employer. 
11 
 
Membership is conditional provision, so participation rates are only observed 
among those individuals who actually work for a company offering a plan, making 
membership decisions to be perfectly mediated by successful provision. Then, in order to 
develop an appropriate counterfactual for the observable membership rate among those 
actually working for an employer offering a pension scheme, we need to consider that 
workers who have the opportunity to save for retirement in a workplace scheme probably 
differ from those who are not offered this opportunity. Such differences are expected to 
occurs mainly in terms of job characteristics like sector (private or public), type (e.g. 
manual, skilled, and managerial), contract (permanent or temporary), and the employing 
company’s number of workers. 
We implement a matching on propensity scores method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985; Austin, 2011) to estimate the potential opt-in rate among employees who haven’t 
been offered a workplace pension plan, had they been offered the opportunity to join a 
scheme. Our results suggest that a policy enforcing pension plan provision at every 
workplace could, alone, generate a major impact on aggregate participation rates. We find 
no evidence that such success is conditional on the existence of mechanisms imposed by 
law concerning the way workers are enrolled or incentivized to join a scheme. For 
instance, policymakers could stimulate financial preparation for retirement through the 
promotion of earning-related workplace pension plans by simply prescribing mandatory 
provision in every workplace, while letting other components of a scheme to be determined 
by labour market circumstances between firms and workers, for example, the enrolment 
process, the level of matching contributions, and the portfolio risk profile and asset 
allocation. 
We build on the literature that evaluates the use of public policy mechanisms with 
different levels of individual choice autonomy to enhance economic decisions (see Felsen 
et al., 2013; Arad and Rubinstein, 2015; Hagman et al., 2015). Allowing employees to 
actively decide (Carrol et al., 2009; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004; Keller et al, 2011) 
whether to opt-in a scheme offered by the company might be preferred to “one-nudge-fits-
all” impersonal defaults when individual characteristics are very heterogeneous, or when 
libertarian-paternalistic government interventions (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003) are 
infeasible, undesirable or unethical (Sunstein, 2013; Arad and Rubinstein, 2015). 
Additionally, a policymaker might want to consider public views and perceptions on the 
use of “nudges”, for example, default options, and how the government should intervene in 
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individuals’ decision-making (Sunstein, 2015; Reisch and Sunstein, 2016; Jung and 
Mellers, 2016). 
Overall, this study highlights that disentangling the effect of provision is necessary 
for the accurate assessment of policy reforms combining universal provision with financial 
incentives and behavioral interventions such as default choices and price subsidies. The 
corresponding analysis is laid out in the rest of the chapter as follows. Section 1 illustrates 
the sampling procedure and presents some descriptive statistics. In Section 2, we describe 
our empirical strategy. In Section 3, we present the main results and some further analyses. 
Section 4 concludes. 
1.1    Institutional background and data 
Earnings-related occupational pension schemes always had a central role in the 
British pension system. Defined benefit pension schemes became dominant during the 
sixties and seventies as an effective way to manage more senior employees out of a 
business. In the eighties, the 1986 Social Security Act included personal pension schemes 
as an alternative tax-privileged investment vehicle for financial preparation for retirement, 
in which both the employer and the worker could make contributions, hence reducing 
membership in occupational pension schemes. During the nineties, the ageing population 
phenomenon started to affect the stability of the National Insurance system. Higher life 
expectancy imposed a larger burden on the pay-as-you-go State pension benefits due to a 
higher old age dependency ratio (ONS, 2012, p.3).  In 2002, the Government established a 
Pensions Commission to review the UK private pension system and long-term savings, and 
to suggest empirically-informed policy reforms. The 2008 Pensions Act put into practice 
the Pensions Commission’s recommendations by introducing a set of reforms within a 
five-year implementation period from October 2012. It imposed a duty on companies to 
provide workplace pension schemes with matching contributions, and automatic enrolment 
of employees into the scheme to overcome behavioural barriers to saving for retirement 
(Bryan et al, 2011).  
The data used in this study consist of waves 2 to 18 of the British Household Panel 
Survey (University of Essex, 2010), covering the years 1992 to 2009, when workers had 
usually to actively opt in a plan and provision of a scheme was still an employer’s 
decision, i.e. not imposed by the 2008 Pensions Act. The wave 1 panel consists of some 
5,500 households and 10,300 individuals drawn from 250 areas of Great Britain. 
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Additional samples of 1,500 households in each of Scotland and Wales were added to the 
main sample in 1999, and in 2001 a sample of 2,000 households was added in Northern 
Ireland, making the panel suitable for UK-wide research. Hence, a representative sample of 
British individuals has been interviewed again each year thereafter. The BHPS provides 
information on respondents’ demographic, occupational, educational, income and saving 
characteristics. The section titled “Employment”, part of the individual questionnaire, 
included the following two subsequent questions:  
I. Does your present employer run a pension scheme or superannuation scheme for 
which you are eligible? Yes; no; don’t know. 
II. Do you belong to your employer's pension scheme? Yes; no; don’t know. 
We used observations of individuals who responded to both questions and indicated 
to have an employed status, not self-employed, when asked about their current economic 
activity. An initial unbalanced panel, made up of 15.481 workers corresponding to 89,760 
person-year observations was obtained. Column 1 of Table 1.1 shows that, on average, a 
workplace pension scheme was offered in 71.14 per cent of the cases over the period. This 
proportion is lower among females and individuals with no degree or further education and 
higher for those respondents aged between 30 and 59 years old. It has a positive relation 
with monthly earnings: only 40.32 per cent of workers in the lowest quintile are provided 
with this opportunity, while among workers in the highest quintile this proportion is equal 
to 87.56 per cent.  In terms of job characteristics, pension provision increases 
monotonically with the number of employees in the workplace, probably due to economies 
of scale, and is much higher for professional/managerial positions, for the non-private 
sector, and for workers with full time and permanent contracts.  
 These proportions have similar patterns when we look at average membership rates 
among those workers actually working for a company offering a pension scheme (see 
Column 2) and, as a consequence, over total participation rates (see Column 3).   
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TABLE 1.1 
 
Provision and participation in workplace pension schemes patterns 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 93. 
(1) (2) (3)
% of employees working 
for a company providing a 
pension scheme
% of employees who are 
members of a pension 
scheme, conditional on 
provision
% of total employees who 
are members of a 
workplace pension 
scheme
All 71.14 73.81 52.51
Males 72.06 75.68 54.53
Females 70.27 71.99 50.58
Age
less than 20 40.89 23.95 9.79
20-29 66.21 60.16 39.83
30-39 74.32 77.71 57.76
40-49 77.35 81.38 62.95
50-59 74.20 79.66 59.10
60 or over 54.02 63.09 34.08
Education
Degree or higher 85.28 85.43 72.86
Further education 82.07 79.51 65.25
A levels or equiv. 72.71 73.55 53.48
O levels or equiv. 68.46 69.92 47.87
Other or no qualifications 58.06 63.68 36.97
Earnings
Quintile group 1 (lowest) 40.32 44.68 18.02
Quintile group 2 61.47 59.98 36.87
Quintile group 3 72.52 71.18 51.61
Quintile group 4 80.63 78.71 63.47
Quintile group 5 (highest) 87.56 87.74 76.82
Number of employees at workplace
1-2 32.27 71.12 22.95
3-9 42.19 65.41 27.60
10-24 58.82 66.63 39.19
25-49 71.10 70.58 50.19
50-99 77.90 72.86 56.76
100-199 82.19 74.44 61.19
200-499 87.80 75.50 66.29
500-999 90.89 80.46 73.12
1000 or more 94.32 83.88 79.12
Job sector
Private firm 61.41 65.25 40.07
Non-private firm 90.99 85.59 77.88
Job type
Professional 85.55 86.98 74.41
Managerial 82.39 82.17 67.70
Skilled non-manual 70.49 69.54 49.02
Skilled manual 59.74 66.85 39.93
Partly skilled 61.17 61.10 37.38
Unskilled 45.53 54.26 24.70
Contract type
Full time 74.98 76.02 56.99
Part time 55.90 62.04 34.68
Permanent 72.49 74.62 54.09
Temporary 45.34 48.96 22.20
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The percentage of total employees who are members of a workplace pension scheme is 
present in the first line of Column 3, showing that 52.51 per cent of workers currently pay 
into a workplace pension scheme. This percentage drops to 40.07 per cent if we consider 
only employees working for private firms. Among males it equals to 46.62 per cent, while 
for females it is equivalent to 32.90 per cent. These numbers are comparable with official 
statistics (ONS, 2011, p. 27) indicating that pensioned workers became a minority for the 
first time in the United Kingdom around the year of 2011, just few years later than the last 
year in our sample. 
1.2    Empirical strategy 
The binary nature of both provision and membership hinder us from making use of 
some methods suggested in the literature of policy evaluation (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 
2009). For example, the control function method would generate inconsistent estimations, 
while other methods require the identification of sufficiently exogenous instruments for 
provision or of a valid continuously distributed special regressor (Lewbel, Dong, and 
Yang, 2012). Despite the fact that workplace pensions are not provided by random 
assignment, they are expected to depend stochastically on a vector of observable variables 
which describe a worker’s job and socio-demographic characteristics.  Hence, we can rely 
on observable predictors of provision, such as job attributes and individual characteristics, 
to account for the selection problem. 
The probability of workplace plan provision conditional on job and socio-
demographic characteristics is called the propensity score, here denoted by 𝑠: 
Pr[𝑝 = 1| 𝐽, 𝑋] = 𝑠(𝐽, 𝑋)      (1) 
where 𝑝 is an indicator variable denoting whether the employer runs a pension scheme in 
which the worker is eligible; and 𝐽 and 𝑋 denote job characteristics and individual socio-
demographic characteristics, respectively. In practice, the propensity score can be 
modelled, given the availability of a rich set of regressors, by implementing a binary 
outcome model, for example, a probit regression of the form: 
Pr[𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 1| 𝐽, 𝑋] = Φ(𝛾1𝐽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡)    (2) 
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function; and 𝜔𝑡 denotes wave-
specific characteristics. Then, with the estimated parameters, we are able to generate 
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predictions for 𝑝𝑖𝑡 conditional on covariates, being ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝐽, 𝑋) estimated propensity score for 
ith case at time t. 
A proper estimation of (2) provides us with some important conditions that are 
required to overcome the selection problem that occurs due to the absence of random 
assignment of provision.  First, because we are able to assume that membership decisions, 
indicated by 𝑌, are independent of provision after controlling for the variation in 𝑌 that is 
induced by differences in 𝐽, 𝑋, i.e. 𝑌 ⊥ 𝑝| 𝐽, 𝑋 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 863).  This 
conditional independence assumption given 𝐽, 𝑋 also implies conditional independence 
given 𝑠(𝐽, 𝑋): 
𝑌 ⊥ 𝑝| 𝐽, 𝑋 ⇒ 𝑌 ⊥ 𝑝| 𝑠(𝐽, 𝑋)     (3) 
Moreover, it is possible to validate the occurrence of the overlap or common support 
condition (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 871), which means that, for every 𝐽, 𝑋, there is a 
positive probability that pension provision failed to occur: 
0 < Pr [𝑝 = 1| 𝐽, 𝑋] < 1      (4) 
Finally, we can verify the occurrence of the balancing condition (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005, p. 864), which in the present evaluation means that for employees with the same 
propensity score, provision of a workplace pension scheme is as random and they should 
look identical in terms of their vectors  𝐽 and 𝑋: 
𝑝 ⊥  𝐽, 𝑋| 𝑠(𝐽, 𝑋)       (5) 
Potential outcomes are inferred from a set of comparison units for whom the 
observable characteristics 𝐽, 𝑋 match those from the units that have provision of a pension 
scheme in the workplace up to some defined degree of closeness. In our setting, we 
implement a nearest-neighbour one-to-one (NN 1:1) matching on propensity scores 
procedure according to the following rule: 
𝐴𝑖𝑡(𝑠(𝐽, 𝑋)) = {𝑠𝑗𝑡|min𝑗𝑡‖𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠𝑗𝑡‖ < 𝑟}    (6) 
This means that all observations with propensity scores situated within a radius r 
are considered as potential matches, but only the closest counterfactual case jth from the 
group of individuals who are provided a scheme is actually matched with the ith case from 
the units with unsuccessful provision. Additionally, we impose exact matching on two 
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regressors: (i) the time variable, to avoid matching two observations from interviews made 
in different waves of the survey, possibly form the same individual; (ii) and on the number 
of employees in the workplace, as this variable showed to be one of the main drivers of 
membership via its effect on provision. Then, the estimated participation rate for the group 
of matched units in which a pension plan is provided identifies the counterfactual outcome 
for the group in which provision is inexistent.  
There is a difference 𝛿 in outcomes that identifies the average causal effect of 
provision on participation among those who were not provided with a workplace pension 
scheme. The literature in treatment evaluation defines this difference as the average 
treatment effect on the untreated. Here, we express it as: 
𝛿 = E[∆𝑌|𝑝 = 0] = E [
(𝑝−𝑠(𝐽,𝑋)𝑌)
Pr[𝑝=1](1−𝑠(𝐽,𝑋))
]   (6) 
A consistent estimator based on a sample of size N and an estimated propensity 
score ?̂?(𝐽𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) can finally be obtained by: 
𝛿 = (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 )
−1
∑ [
1
𝑁
(𝑝𝑖−?̂?(𝐽𝑖,𝑋𝑖))𝑌𝑖
(1−?̂?(𝐽𝑖,𝑋𝑖))
]𝑁𝑖=1     (7) 
In some specifications we impose matching without replacement (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005, p. 873; Austin, 2011, p. 405).  In these cases, observations from the units 
that are not provided a pension scheme is matched to no more than one closest neighbour 
in which provision is successful. Also, we check whether the overlap condition and the 
balancing conditions from (4) and (5) hold. Notwithstanding, these previous checks may 
still be insufficient to determine whether omitted variables can alter the inference of the 
provision selection process, the conditional independence assumption from eq. (3). Hence, 
we implement the sensitivity analysis proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) and developed by 
Becker and Caliendo (2007), in which we infer how strongly a hidden bias caused by 
omitted covariates must influence provision in order to erode the outcomes of the matching 
procedure. 
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TABLE 1.2 
Probit estimates (odds ratios) for the probability of pension provision  
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 93. 
Dependent variable = 1 if employer offers a pension scheme; =0 otherwise
Coefficient Std. error P-value
Demographics
Male -0.005 0.024 0.825
Age 0.052 0.012 0.000
Age
2 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Education
Degree or higher [base ]
Further education 0.004 0.049 0.942
A levels or equiv. -0.005 0.036 0.897
O levels or equiv. -0.016 0.036 0.652
Other or no qualifications -0.122 0.039 0.002
Household income -0.107 0.046 0.020
Household income
2 0.013 0.003 0.000
Job characteristics
Earnings 1.049 0.154 0.000
Earnings
2 -0.046 0.012 0.000
Number of employees at workplace
1-2 [base ]
3-9 0.159 0.044 0.000
10-24 0.472 0.045 0.000
25-49 0.739 0.046 0.000
50-99 0.960 0.047 0.000
100-199 1.147 0.049 0.000
200-499 1.457 0.050 0.000
500-999 1.601 0.055 0.000
1000 or more 1.625 0.053 0.000
Job sector
Private firm [base ]
Civil servant 1.424 0.058 0.000
Local govt. 1.624 0.038 0.000
NHS or higher education 1.267 0.046 0.000
Nationalised industry 0.803 0.163 0.000
Non-profit organisation 0.467 0.050 0.000
Armed forces 1.106 0.176 0.000
Other 0.310 0.075 0.000
Job type
Professional [base ]
Managerial -0.04 0.051 0.432
Skilled non-manual 0.099 0.053 0.064
Skilled manual -0.323 0.055 0.000
Partly skilled -0.238 0.055 0.000
Unskilled -0.451 0.068 0.000
Armed forces -0.154 0.272 0.572
Contract type
Full time 0.028 0.028 0.321
Permanent 0.978 0.034 0.000
Number of observations
Number of individuals
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald Chi-squared(68)
Pseudo R
2
89,760
15,481
-36,070.18
8,067.65
0.331
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FIGURE 1.1 
 
a. Conditional probabilities of employer offering a pension scheme by wave 
 
 
b. Conditional probabilities of employer offering a pension scheme by number of 
employees in the workplace 
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1.3     Main results and further analysis 
The first step of our empirical strategy is to estimate the propensity score model of 
pension provision. Table 1.2 reports the estimates of the probit regression given by eq. (2). 
The covariates are the same presented in the descriptive statistics, but now we also include 
real household equivalent income as an additional demographic characteristic. Region and 
wave identifiers were also included but are omitted in Table 1.2. Among the demographic 
characteristics, we can observe that age predicts pension provision, but not gender, 
education and household income.  
All job characteristics included as covariates are significant. A full-time contract is 
not a significant predictor, but a permanent contract is and has a positive relation with 
pension provision. As highlighted in the descriptive statistics, the number of employees at 
the workplace has a strong monotonic positive relation with pension provision. This 
relation can be observed in Figure 1.1a, plotting the predicted probabilities for employer 
offering a plan by the number of employees at the workplace. The dynamics of pension 
provision evolution across the waves of the survey can be observed in Figure 1.1b. An 
increase is observed during the beginning of the current century (between waves nine and 
eleven), but with provision remaining stable until the last period of the sample (wave 
eighteen). 
In order to verify the occurrence of the overlapping condition from (4), we first 
impose common support on the estimated propensity scores ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝐽, 𝑋). This procedure drops 
52 observations in which a pension scheme is offered and whose score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum score of the group without pension provision. Figure 
1.2 shows the propensity score histogram by provision status. We can verify that the scores 
from both groups of observations clearly overlap across the entire probability range, and 
that the few dropped observations are situated in really extreme scores, close to unit. In 
sum, this means that even after imposing common support, there is always a positive 
probability that pension provision failed to occur for each unit in the group of individuals 
who are offered a pension scheme. 
Having checked the overlap condition, we address the relationship of primary 
interest to this study, the effect of pension provision on membership outcomes represented 
in eq. (7). Column 1 in Table 1.3 shows the unmatched sample average membership, 
already presented in the descriptive statistics (Column 2 in Table 1.1), and repeated here 
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for comparison. Columns 2-7 in Table 1.3 report the average membership across different 
matching procedures in which was required common support and exact match on wave and 
in the scale variable identifying the number of employees in the workplace.  The estimates 
suggest that pension provision has a major effect on membership rates. This can be also 
interpreted as the potential opt-in rate among those workers who haven’t been offered a 
plan, had they been offered a scheme by the employer. As one can observe, by decreasing 
the radius used to match nearest-neighbours and imposing no replacement of previously 
matched counterfactual units, the number of observations on support decreases, but this 
does not vanish the major effect of provision on membership rates. 
 
FIGURE 1.2 
 
Histogram of estimated propensity scores by provision status 
 
 
To verify the balancing condition described by eq. (5), we use our most restrictive 
specification, shown in Column 7 in Table 1.3, which imposes the smallest radius (r = 
0.001) and no replacement. Figure 1.3 shows the effectiveness of the matching procedures 
to balance the two groups of observations in terms of: a) wave (2-18); b) number of 
workers in the job place (scale 1-9); and c) demographic and job characteristics. The 
standardized percentage bias for each covariate is obtained by dividing the mean of the 
group in which pension provision occurs by the mean of the control group, then subtracting 
one and multiplying by one hundred. We check its robustness by also including 
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characteristics that weren’t used as covariates in the estimation of the propensity score, but 
are expected to affect a worker’s decision to have retirement savings, such as household 
type (e.g. couple with dependent children) and home tenure (e.g. pays rent). In sum, we 
observe that for employees with very close propensity scores, provision of a workplace 
pension scheme is as good as random, since both groups are quite similar in terms of 
covariates.  
Our last check involves the conditional independence assumption. Because we do 
not observe perfectly all variables simultaneously influencing provision of workplace 
schemes and membership decisions, matching estimators might be biased. We need to 
check whether unobserved covariates can sensibly change the inference about the effect of 
provision on membership rates, or alternatively, how strong an unmeasured variable must 
influence the selection process to erode the implications of the previously performed 
matching analysis. For this, we implemented the procedure operationalised by Becker and 
Caliendo (2007) which builds on the bounding approach of Rosenbaum (2002). Because 
we have a binary outcome, pension plan membership, the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test 
statistic 𝑄𝑚ℎ is used. Rosembaum (2002) shows that this test statistics is bounded by a pair 
of known distributions, in which two scenarios are particularly useful: 𝑄𝑚ℎ+ is the test 
statistic given that the effect of provision on membership was overestimated, and 𝑄𝑚ℎ− the 
case where we have underestimated it. 
The adjusted 𝑄𝑚ℎ statistics and their corresponding bounds on the significance 
levels in P-values for each level of hidden bias are reported in Table 1.4. We present 
statistics for specifications in which the caliper distance r is equal to 0.001, with and 
without replacement.  The bias due to unobserved covariates is Г and represents odds of 
differential assignment to provision, so for instance Г = 1 assumes no hidden bias, and 
Г = 2 assumes a hidden bias that would double the odds. Given that we have a positive 
estimated effect of provision on membership rates, we can focus on the bounds under the 
assumption that we have overestimated such effect, i.e. 𝑄𝑚ℎ+ . The effect is significant at 
Г = 1 does not become insignificant for higher levels of hidden bias, stating that the 
confidence intervals for the effect of provision on membership would not include zero if an 
unobserved covariate caused the odds ratio of assignment to pension provisions to differ 
between the two groups. In summary, the results are not sensitive to deviations from the 
conditional independence assumption and that the estimation procedure has an 
identification strategy that is not invalidated. 
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TABLE 1.3 
 
Matching on propensity scores estimates for the opt-in rate (average treatment effect on the untreated) 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 93. 
Outcome variable = 1 if worker is a member of a workplace pension scheme; = 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Provision 0.738 0.500 0.518 0.564 0.558 0.562 0.582
[Std. errors] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Radius No 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.005 0.001
Common support No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No replacement No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exact match on:
Wave (2-18) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employees at workplace (scale 1-9) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Off support 0 3,045 5,120 12,743 10,278 11,221 15,589
On support 89,760 86,715 84,640 77,017 79,482 78,539 74,171
Employer does not provide a scheme 63,856 22,859 20,784 13,161 15,626 14,683 10,315
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FIGURE 1.3 
 
Balancing condition 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.4 
 
Mantel-Haenszel adjusted statistics and significance levels   
 
 
Г Q mh+ P-value Q mh- P-value
1 101.063 0.000 101.063 0.000
2 129.266 0.000 78.4906 0.000
3 149.476 0.000 67.2449 0.000
4 166.064 0.000 60.0186 0.000
5 180.512 0.000 54.8152 0.000
10 236.961 0.000 40.758 0.000
20 317.984 0.000 29.6833 0.000
Г Q mh+ P-value Q mh- P-value
1 92.0402 0.000 92.0402 0.000
2 116.971 0.000 71.3886 0.000
3 134.108 0.000 60.9675 0.000
4 147.733 0.000 54.2574 0.000
5 159.315 0.000 49.4298 0.000
10 202.726 0.000 36.4583 0.000
20 262.523 0.000 26.3729 0.000
With replacement, r  = 0.001
No replacement, r  = 0.001
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1.3.1 Employees of private sector firms  
In this subsection, we report the estimates of eq. (7) with data only from workers 
employed by private companies. This is relevant in the analysis due to its policy 
implication: workplace plans offered by private employers are usually different from the 
ones offered by public companies. For example, the proportion of 83 per cent of employees 
in the public sector who belonged to a workplace pension scheme can be decomposed in 
79 per cent belonging to a defined benefit scheme, and the remainder 4 per cent belonging 
to defined contribution, group personal or group stakeholder plans. In the private sector, 
these proportions are expected to be much more balanced and affect membership rates 
differently. According to official statistics  from the ONS (2011, p. 27), participation rates 
in the private sector are smaller than in the public sector, 32 percent and 83 per cent, 
respectively, in the year of 2011. 
The estimates across different matching procedures shown in Columns 2-7 in Table 
1.5 suggest that pension provision has a major effect on membership rates also when we 
constrain the analysis to the private sector. Again, by decreasing the radius and imposing 
no replacement of previously matched counterfactual units, the number of observations on 
support decreases, but this does not dissipate the major effect of provision on membership 
rates. 
1.3.2 The decision to opt-in among employees who have been just offered a 
plan  
Our main analysis does not make reference to situations in which an employee was 
just offered a workplace pension plan.  This may be of particular interest of policymakers 
aiming to infer how fast an average employee reacts to this new opportunity and how this 
affects membership rates in the short-term. Automatic enrolment has been indicated as one 
key mechanism to overcome behavioural barriers to saving for retirement because it helps 
to mitigate the effects of procrastination, status quo bias and inertia (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Madrian and Shea, 2001). Hence, we can 
make use of the present dataset to identify the determinants of opt-in decisions in the short-
term, i.e. the choice of a worker to adhere to the workplace pension plan immediately after 
it starts to be offered by his employer.   
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We identify 3,757 transitions which denote situations in which an employee was 
not working for a company providing a workplace pension plan in a baseline wave of the 
survey (𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 = 0), and started to work for a company running a pension scheme in a 
follow up period (𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 1). Hence, these transition might have occurred due to job changes 
or even companies which started to offer a workplace plan to their employees. This set of 
information is not observable in the data. Then, we estimate the following model for their 
decision to opt-in the scheme: 
Pr[𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 = 0] = Φ(𝛾2𝐽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡)  (8) 
where the decision to opt-in the scheme is indicated by 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1, and zero otherwise; 𝐽𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of job characteristics that also includes now job satisfaction and whether the worker 
has promotion opportunities; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of demographic and household characteristics 
including, for instance, housing tenure and household type;  and 𝐹𝑖𝑡 is a vector of other 
financial conditions, for example, whether the worker has a personal pension plan, whether 
the workers saves from current income and whether he or she has problems to pay for 
housing. The estimates of the model represented by eq. (8) are shown in Table 1.6.  
Among the demographic characteristics, education level is one of the main 
determinants of short-term opt-in decisions. Compared with the base level “Degree”, all 
the coefficients associated with this categorical variable are negative and significant. 
Figure 1.4 shows the predicted membership rate for each education level. The conditional 
opt-in rate for workers with a degree is much higher than the one for those with lower 
qualifications. In terms of household characteristics, couples irrespectively if they have 
dependent children or not are more likely to opt-in than single adults. None of the financial 
conditions include as covariates turned to be significant. In terms of job characteristics, 
employees of the central or local government, for example, civil servants, and those 
working for the NHS or higher education institutions, are more likely to opt-in than those 
employed by a private firm.  Being a full-time worker does not significantly predict the 
decision to opt-in decision, but having a permanent position is an important driver.  
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TABLE 1.5 
 
Matching on propensity scores estimates for the opt-in rate (average treatment effect on the untreated) – Private sector only 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 93. 
Outcome variable = 1 if worker is a member of a workplace pension scheme; = 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Provision 0.652 0.489 0.507 0.551 0.544 0.546 0.554
[Std. errors] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Radius No 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.005 0.001
Common support No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No replacement No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exact match on:
Wave (2-18) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employees at workplace (scale 1-9) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Off support 0 3,074 4,992 12,163 9,768 10,666 14,664
On support 60,227 57,153 55,235 48,064 50,459 49,561 45,563
Employer does not provide a scheme 23,244 20,170 18,252 11,081 13,476 12,578 8,580
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TABLE 1.6 
 
Probit estimates (odd ratios) for the probability of the decision to opt-in among 
employees who have been just offered a workplace pension plan 
 
Cont. 
  
Dependent variable = 1 if member of pension scheme; =0 otherwise
Coefficient Std. error P-value
Demographics / HH characteristics
Male 0.032 0.058 0.577
Age 0.055 0.012 0.000
Age
2 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Education
Degree or higher [base ]
Further education 0.004 0.111 0.000
A levels or equiv. -0.439 0.080 0.000
O levels or equiv. -0.316 0.082 0.000
Other or no qualifications -0.458 0.094 0.000
Household income -0.398 0.151 0.008
Household income
2 0.020 0.009 0.031
Household type
Single: non-elderly [base ]
Single: elderly 0.039 0.668 0.953
Couple: no children 0.160 0.102 0.117
Couple: dep. children 0.209 0.103 0.042
Couple: non-dep. children 0.192 0.114 0.092
Lone parent: dep. children 0.227 0.141 0.106
Lone parent: non-dep. children 0.091 0.164 0.582
Unrelated adults 0.058 0.174 0.739
Other 0.191 0.189 0.312
Housing tenure
Owned with mortgage [base ]
Local authority rented -0.024 0.077 0.754
Housing assoc. rented -0.111 0.114 0.333
Rented from employer 0.238 0.360 0.509
Rented private: unfurnished 0.032 0.098 0.742
Rented private: furnished -0.096 0.123 0.438
Financial conditions
Has personal pension plan -0.017 0.063 0.788
Saves from current income 0.064 0.047 0.178
Has problems paying for housing -0.055 0.082 0.505
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TABLE 1.6. Cont. 
  
Notes on tables are presented from page 94. 
Dependent variable = 1 if member of pension scheme; =0 otherwise
Coefficient Std. error P-value
Job characteristics
Earnings -0.051 0.458 0.911
Earnings
2 0.034 0.034 0.317
Number of employees at workplace
1-2 [base ]
3-9 -0.120 0.165 0.466
10-24 -0.284 0.162 0.079
25-49 -0.181 0.164 0.269
50-99 -0.211 0.166 0.202
100-199 -0.193 0.169 0.254
200-499 -0.105 0.168 0.531
500-999 -0.120 0.186 0.518
1000 or more 0.071 0.178 0.691
Job sector
Private firm [base ]
Civil servant 1.219 0.169 0.000
Local govt. 0.931 0.088 0.000
NHS or higher education 1.225 0.111 0.000
Nationalised industry 0.148 0.316 0.640
Non-profit organisation 0.121 0.127 0.342
Armed forces 0.537 0.496 0.248
Other -0.032 0.325 0.922
Job type
Professional [base ]
Managerial 0.067 0.121 0.580
Skilled non-manual 0.071 0.127 0.577
Skilled manual -0.119 0.132 0.367
Partly skilled -0.190 0.137 0.164
Unskilled -0.233 0.183 0.222
Armed forces 0.509 0.771 0.510
Contract type
Full time 0.071 0.086 0.412
Permanent 0.728 0.113 0.000
Job satisfaction (scale 1-7)
Not satisfied at all = 1 [base ]
2 -0.094 0.258 0.717
3 -0.005 0.224 0.983
Not satisfied/dissatisfied = 4 0.087 0.221 0.694
5 0.098 0.210 0.641
6 0.208 0.208 0.317
Completely satisfied = 7 0.346 0.213 0.105
Promotion opportunities -0.060 0.050 0.231
Number of observations
Number of individuals
Conditional short-term opt-in rate [std. error] 0.356 [0.007]
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald Chi-squared(68)
Pseudo R
2
3,757
3,145
-2,087.30
616.71
0.147
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The conditional opt-in rate predicted by the model is 35.6 per cent (see bottom of 
Table 1.6). This rate reflects short-term decisions join the scheme just after provision 
starts, being much smaller than the average aggregate membership rates estimated in the 
previous main analysis. This suggests that provision of workplace pension plans have an 
effect on membership rates, but this phenomenon does not occur immediately after a 
worker is offered a plan, mainly in the private sector. 
FIGURE 1.4 
Conditional probability of workplace pension plan membership by education level 
 
1.3.3 The evolution of opt-in rates 
One of the limitations of the dataset used in this study is that we do not observe the 
characteristics of the pension plan offered to the employee. For example, we do not 
observe whether there are matching contributions by the employer, how simplified the 
enrolment process is or which kind of occupational pension scheme.is offered, e.g. defined 
benefit or defined contribution. Madrian (2012) reviews previous studies and denote that 
even with a matching employer contribution participation rates are often surprisingly low. 
Also, the study indicates that increasing the matching rate leads to small increases in 
savings. Beshears et al. (2010) find that when the employer match is eliminated or reduced, 
participation rates under automatic enrolment do not decline significantly. These previous 
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findings suggest that when automatic enrolment is implemented, it becomes a key driver of 
participation in a workplace pension scheme.  
The emergence of automatic enrolment policies was promoted by American 
companies in the end of 1990s seeking for a preventive strategy for dealing with the IRS 
non-discrimination rules that conditioned the tax deductible status of a pension plan on the 
absence of a participation pattern that is skewed toward highly paid employees. Despite 
being a cheaper, simple and ingenious method, automatic enrolment was shown effective. 
It was recommended by consultants to companies exposed to potential discrimination 
features in their workplace-provided pension schemes. Simultaneously, academic research 
on saving behaviour opened an avenue for new research directions. The seminal works 
done by Madrian and Shea (2001), Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Choi et al. (2004) and Choi 
et al. (2006) analysed data from American companies in the end of the 1990s. A national 
public policy implementing automatic enrolment and other default options regarding 
contribution rates and asset allocation stated to be practiced in in New Zealand in 2007. 
Benartzi and Thaler (2013) indicate that the percentage of American employers offering 
401(k) plan with automatic enrolment grew from 14 per cent in 2003 to 34 per cent in 2007 
and to 58 per cent in 2009. 
It becomes important to analyse the possibility that automatic enrolment started to 
be widely used in the United Kingdom at some point from wave 2 to wave 18. First, we 
estimate the following model for their decision to opt-in the scheme: 
Pr[𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 1] = Φ(𝛾3𝐽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡)   (9) 
The estimates of the model represented by eq. (9) are shown in Table 1.7. Opt-in 
rates predicted by the model remained stable or even decreased since the second half of the 
nineties. Figures 1.5a shows that there was no upward trend on opt-in rates that would 
suggest a wide use of automatic enrolment in workplace pension schemes in the United 
Kingdom. In fact, these rates slightly decline between waves 9 and 11. The same 
conclusion is obtained when we observe the evolution of opt-in rates only among private 
sector workers shown in Figure 1.5b.   
Although this analysis does not include automatic enrolment as a predictor, the 
stable membership ratse observed in Figure 1.5a and 1.5b do not suggest the occurrence of 
a sensible increase in the use of automatic enrolment during the sample period. 
Additionally, official statistics from the United Kingdom’s Department for Work and 
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Pensions (2012) suggests that employers’ likelihood to apply automatic enrolment in 
workplace pension schemes is positively associated with company size. For example, 
employer awareness of the specific duties to automatically enrol employees was lowest for 
micro employers at 46 per cent; 67 per cent for small employers; 84 per cent for medium 
employers; and 93 per cent for large employers. Similarly, support for automatic enrolment 
also varied with employer size, ranging from less than half of micro employers to nearly 
three quarters of large employers agreeing it is a good idea. Automatic enrolment practice 
is also sector specific. For example, since January 2007, all teachers aged between 18 and 
70 have been automatically enrolled into the Teachers’ Pension Scheme. In this sense, 
observing employer size and sector helps to overcome limitations generated by the 
unobserved characteristic of workplace pension plan enrolment process in our data. 
Employer size and sector can also be verified as major determinants of the practice 
to automatically enrol employees into a company’s pension scheme from British data 
provided in the Wealth and Assets Survey in its waves 2 and 3 (2008-2012). The 
frequencies presented in Appendix 1.A shows that within those who were automatically 
enrolled, this procedure was more frequently declared by those workers from larger non-
private companies. Within private sector workers, completing a detailed form is the most 
common declared procedure in both waves – around 40 per cent, followed by automatic 
enrolment – around 22 per cent. On the contrary, for non-private and other types of 
organizations, automatic enrolment is the most frequent declared procedure among those 
individuals that are members of an occupational scheme. In wave 2, for example, 1,049 
workers out of 2,819 (or 42.6 per cent) who were member of a workplace pension scheme 
declared to have been automatically enrolled, with wave 3 showing similar results.   
Despite the existence of automatic enrolment in a reasonable scale even before the 
Reform started in 2012, there was no upward trend on opt-in rates that would suggest an 
increasing use of automatic enrolment in workplace pension schemes in the United 
Kingdom that would not be due to observable sector characteristics and employer size.  
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TABLE 1.7 
 
Probit estimates (odds ratios) for probability of the decision to opt-in conditional on 
provision  
 
Cont. 
  
Dependent variable = 1 if member of pension scheme; =0 otherwise
Coefficient Std. error P-value
Demographics / HH characteristics
Male 0.018 0.031 0.577
Age 0.118 0.008 0.000
Age
2 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Education
Degree or higher [base ]
Further education -0.210 0.051 0.000
A levels or equiv. -0.124 0.043 0.004
O levels or equiv. -0.170 0.043 0.000
Other or no qualifications -0.237 0.050 0.000
Household income -0.104 0.060 0.080
Household income
2 0.011 0.004 0.006
Household type
Single: non-elderly [base ]
Single: elderly -0.098 0.216 0.650
Couple: no children -0.057 0.047 0.224
Couple: dep. children 0.003 0.048 0.946
Couple: non-dep. children -0.068 0.053 0.202
Lone parent: dep. children -0.128 0.070 0.067
Lone parent: non-dep. children -0.176 0.075 0.020
Unrelated adults -0.157 0.071 0.027
Other -0.118 0.083 0.027
Housing tenure
Owned with mortgage [base ]
Local authority rented -0.208 0.047 0.000
Housing assoc. rented -0.097 0.070 0.166
Rented from employer -0.031 0.150 0.836
Rented private: unfurnished -0.302 0.050 0.000
Rented private: furnished -0.228 0.053 0.000
Financial conditions
Has personal pension plan -0.508 0.034 0.000
Saves from current income 0.216 0.020 0.000
Has problems paying for housing -0.158 0.034 0.000
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TABLE 1.7. Cont. 
  
Notes on tables are presented from page 94. 
Dependent variable = 1 if member of pension scheme; =0 otherwise
Coefficient Std. error P-value
Job characteristics
Earnings 0.649 0.246 0.008
Earnings
2 0.000 0.018 0.995
Number of employees at workplace
1-2 [base ]
3-9 -0.025 0.086 0.711
10-24 -0.410 0.085 0.628
25-49 0.011 0.086 0.899
50-99 0.055 0.086 0.522
100-199 0.105 0.086 0.220
200-499 0.201 0.086 0.019
500-999 0.377 0.088 0.000
1000 or more 0.307 0.089 0.001
Job sector
Private firm [base ]
Civil servant 1.197 0.063 0.000
Local govt. 0.844 0.041 0.000
NHS or higher education 0.730 0.051 0.000
Nationalised industry 0.602 0.110 0.000
Non-profit organisation 0.061 0.065 0.347
Armed forces 1.298 0.165 0.000
Other 0.389 0.098 0.000
Job type
Professional [base ]
Managerial -0.096 0.053 0.071
Skilled non-manual 0.017 0.058 0.762
Skilled manual -0.180 0.062 0.004
Partly skilled -0.239 0.063 0.000
Unskilled -0.332 0.091 0.000
Armed forces 0.552 0.330 0.094
Contract type
Full time -0.072 0.041 0.081
Permanent 0.834 0.048 0.000
Job satisfaction (scale 1-7)
Not satisfied at all = 1 [base ]
2 -0.008 0.073 0.911
3 0.114 0.069 0.096
Not satisfied/dissatisfied = 4 0.044 0.071 0.535
5 0.092 0.068 0.177
6 0.067 0.067 0.317
Completely satisfied = 7 0.035 0.071 0.624
Promotion opportunities -0.008 0.022 0.708
Number of observations
Number of individuals
Conditional short-term opt-in rate [std. error] 0.742 [0.003]
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald Chi-squared(68)
Pseudo R
2
52,027
10,688
-22,516.15
4,076.71
0.244
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FIGURE 1.5 
 
a. Conditional probability of workplace pension plan membership by wave 
 
 
b. Conditional probability of workplace pension plan membership by wave  
Private sector only 
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1.4 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed how effective the opportunity given to a worker to join a 
workplace pension scheme is in order to generate an impact on pension plan participation. 
The results from a propensity score matching indicate that provision at every workplace 
can generate a major impact on aggregate participation rates, usually superior to 50 per 
cent. We also find no evidence that such success is conditional on the existence of policy 
rules concerning the way workers are enrolled or incentivized to join a scheme. By 
performing a set of robustness checks, we claim that these findings are not significantly 
sensitive to a hidden bias in the estimated propensity scores. When we repeated the 
analysis including only observations from employees of private companies, we observe 
that workplace pension provision still has a major impact on aggregate participation.  
In order to consider how immediate an average employee reacts to the new 
opportunity to save for his retirement via a workplace pension scheme, and how this 
affects membership rates in the short-term, we analysed situations in which an employee 
just started to be offered an occupational pension scheme. We show that education level is 
one of the main predictors of short-term opt-in decisions along with having a permanent 
position. The average short-term opt-in rate predicted by the model is 35.6 per cent. 
Specifically among workers in the private sector, the predicted rate is of 30.2 per cent, and 
for those not employed by private firms, this percentage is equal to 54.6 per cent, 
highlighting the potential different characteristics between the pension schemes offered by 
private and non-private employers. 
One of the limitations of this study is that we do not observe the characteristics of 
the pension plan offered by the company to the employees. Because automatic enrolment 
emerged as a practice among American companies in the end of 1990s, and consequently 
increased opt-in rates among those companies offering 401(k) plans, it becomes important 
to check whether there is evidence that automatic enrolment started to be widely used also 
in the United Kingdom during the period analysed in the present study. We show that 
predicted opt-in rates remained stable in the United Kingdom since the second half of the 
nineties. The inexistence of a positive trend in opt-in rates suggests the absence of an 
increasing use of automatic enrolment in workplace pension schemes. The same 
conclusion is obtained when we observe the evolution of opt-in rates among private sector 
workers. 
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The main policy contribution of this study is to suggest that pension reforms can 
still obtain major impacts on participation rates by prescribing mandatory provision of 
pension schemes in every workplace while letting other components of a scheme to be 
determined by active decisions of firms and workers. Automatic enrolment might be 
helpful to reduce the time an employee takes to opt-in a plan, i.e. to affect what we called 
here as the short-term opt-in rate. This comes with the cost of a “one-size-fits-all” 
impersonal default option that might not be appropriate due to heterogeneous 
characteristics of the population, especially in terms of the contribution rate. According to 
our results, the reform initiated in the United Kingdom from October 2012, established by 
the 2008 Pensions Act, could also be called “Universal Provision” alongside with 
“Automatic Enrolment”. 
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1.5 Appendix 
Appendix 1.A 
Enrolment procedure declared by members of employer pension scheme 
Wealth and Assets Survey - Waves 2 and 3 
 
 
Completed 
detailed form
Automatically 
enrolled
Signed pre-
completed form
Yes-or-No 
declaration
Other/Don't 
know
 Total 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A. Private firms
Wave 2 (2008-2010)
1 - 10 133 75 32 42 36 318
11 - 24 103 62 37 29 29 260
25 - 49 118 68 38 45 42 311
50 - 249 324 160 95 109 77 765
250 - 499 146 95 57 48 40 386
500 or more 225 170 76 79 54 604
Number of observations 1,049 630 335 352 278 2,644
Wave 3 (2010-2012)
1 - 10 124 53 27 46 47 297
11 - 24 126 52 38 33 29 278
25 - 49 118 47 40 34 36 275
50 - 249 304 161 111 92 66 734
250 - 499 139 81 54 38 35 347
500 or more 235 162 88 90 55 630
Number of observations 1,046 556 358 333 268 2,561
Panel B. Non-private 
firms and other org.
Wave 2 (2008-2010)
1 - 10 52 85 26 28 15 206
11 - 24 81 100 37 38 25 281
25 - 49 93 172 34 70 38 407
50 - 249 91 340 73 121 68 693
250 - 499 97 130 28 54 22 331
500 or more 230 374 89 141 67 901
Number of observations 644 1,201 287 452 235 2,819
Wave 3 (2010-2012)
1 - 10 58 68 30 23 16 195
11 - 24 85 79 24 48 18 254
25 - 49 112 151 25 70 27 385
50 - 249 199 309 72 128 77 785
250 - 499 73 88 37 41 26 265
500 or more 194 391 71 140 99 895
Number of observations 721 1,086 259 450 263 2,779
How did you join the pension scheme you are a member of?
Number of employees at 
the workplace
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Chapter 2 
Does the provision of workplace pension plans affect other 
savings? 
 
Pension wealth accumulation has become a major attention of policymakers who 
deal with the consequences of the ageing population phenomenon. For instance, old-age 
benefits provided by State pensions are expected to rise, and so is the insolvency risk of 
national pension systems. With the increased adoption of fully funded private pension 
plans, much of the responsibility for old-age benefits provision has moved from 
governments’ budgets to households’ finances. Additionally, most employers have 
substituted occupational defined benefit plans for defined contribution schemes to mitigate 
balance sheet exposures to pension fund imbalances. This led to a sharp increase in 
workers’ required level of awareness about the adequacy of their financial preparation for 
retirement. Financial literacy interventions have been suggested to help citizens to make 
informed decisions and improve their downstream financial behaviour (Lusardi, 2008; 
Fernandes et al, 2014; Miller et al, 2015). Financial awareness would then counteract the 
increasing complexity of sophisticated products and the facilitated access to credit (Lusardi 
and Mitchell, 2007).  
Some national pension systems have concomitantly consolidated the accumulation 
of wealth through workplace pension schemes. Through the implementation of wide policy 
reforms, countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, have establish workplace provided pension schemes as a major pillar to sustain 
their citizens’ appropriate financial preparation for retirement. For instance, the United 
Kingdom’s Pensions Act 2008 established the universal provision of workplace pension 
plans by all employers and the automatic enrolment of eligible employees into these 
schemes. A body of evidence in behavioural sciences supports that when workers are 
defaulted into pension schemes, participation rates are higher than if they had made the 
standard decision to opt in or not (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2006; Benartzi and 
Thaler, 2013).  
While default choices are expected to effectively boost workplace pension plans’ 
participation, the effect on overall savings is still ambiguous. For example, an increase in 
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workplace pension contributions could be financed by a reduction in the amount 
households would save in other forms (Crawford et al, 2012). Using administrative data, 
Chetty et al (2014) addressed the crowd-out on savings accounts and showed that the effect 
of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change 
savings rates by active or passive choice. In summary, price subsidies induce wealthier and 
more sophisticated individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts.  
Usual limitations in available data and research designs are appointed as reasons for 
the still not clear identification of the relationship between pension and non-pension 
financial saving. Administrative data is usually not easily available, making the use of 
national surveys containing self-reported measures of wealth accumulation and saving 
attitudes the most frequent data source. Guariglia and Markrose (2000) showed that 
contributions to personal pension plans are made essentially for retirement purposes, 
whereas conventional savings are done for precautionary motives. The study of Banks et al 
(2002) indicates that those who have accumulated pension wealth tend to have larger 
balances in financial wealth than those without, while a certain degree of substitutability 
between earning-related pension schemes and financial wealth was suggested by Attanasio 
and Rohwedder (2003). Using data from the mid-2000s, Crossley and O’Dea (2010) 
showed that those who paid into a pension tended to have higher non-pension wealth than 
those who didn’t pay into a pension. More recently, Crawford et al (2015) pointed that 
active saving in financial assets is greater among those reporting saving for retirement or 
for an investment. Despite these efforts, the endogenous relation of saving decisions 
imposes empirical challenges to a correct identification of causality. 
Workplace pensions are not provided by random assignment. Their provision by 
employers is expected to on a vector of characteristics which describe the job position and 
the worker socio-demographics.  This study originally exploits the variability in workplace 
pension scheme provision and membership induced by the employer’s payroll size in 
number of employees as an identification strategy. First of all, we show that the chance of 
an employee to work for a firm which offers a pension scheme increases monotonically 
with the corresponding number of co-workers. Also, conditional on provision, opt in 
decisions in workplace plans increase with the number of workers, potentially due to the 
fact that, on average, larger employers offer more attractive pension plans. We claim that 
the number of workers at the workplace is a sufficiently exogenous instrumental variable 
(Angrist et al., 1996; Angrist and Krueger, 2001), which allows us to identify the causal 
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effect of workplace pensions on other forms of savings such as personal pension plans and 
financial vehicles. In short, except through the engagement in a workplace pension 
scheme, the number of co-workers is not expected to affect saving decisions. 
The corresponding analysis is performed using British data from two national 
surveys. We use data containing information about workers’ saving attitudes from the 
British Household Panel Survey (University of Essex, 2010) for the years 1992 to 2008; 
and from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) for the years 2008 to 2012. During this 
sample period, the decision to provide a workplace pension scheme was still an employer’s 
decision, i.e. not mandatory as it came later by the reform legislated by the Pensions Act 
2008. In our results, we find no evidence that providing employees with access to 
workplace pension schemes would make them less likely to save through non-pension 
financial instruments. Precisely, when we find a significant effect, it is positive, which is in 
accordance with previous relationships observed in the literature. Also, given the natural 
substitutability between pension vehicles, workplace pensions have shown a negative 
impact on personal pension plan participation,. 
Overall, this study builds on the literature which suggests the relevance of 
workplace pension schemes in the apparatus of national pension systems. To lay out the 
present analysis, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 illustrates the 
sampling procedure and provides descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. Section 
2 describes our empirical strategy, while in Section 3 we present the main results and 
further analyses. Section 4 concludes and discusses policy implications. 
2.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used in this study consists of waves 2 to 18 of the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) for the years 1992 to 2008; and of waves 2 and 3 from the Wealth and 
Assets Survey (WAS) for the years 2008 to 2012. During this period, automatic enrolment 
of employees into a workplace pension’s scheme was not a practice enforced by law, as it 
came later by the legislation of the Pensions Act 2008. Until 2012, most British workers 
still had to actively choose to opt in workplace pension plans and the provision of such 
schemes was still a decision of employers. Additionally to questions related with pensions 
(Appendix A), both datasets contain information about job characteristics expected to be 
related to workplace pensions provision and membership, for example, the number of 
employees in the job place, type of contract (e.g. full-time, permanent), firm sector (e.g. 
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private) and job classification. Other household and individual characteristics expected to 
be related to the variables of interest are also available, such as household income, tenure, 
and type; education, and earnings. 
We used observations of employed individuals (not self-employed) who responded 
to all the questions related to: i) workplace pension plan provision and membership; ii) the 
number of employees in the workplace; iii) whether the worker has recently paid into a 
personal pension plan; iii) and whether he has recently saved any income. Given this, our 
initial samples are composed by 99,351 observations from 16,816 individuals who were 
respondents to the BHPS; and 26,870 observations from 20,385 individuals who responded 
to the WAS. The proportions of observations in which an employee reports that his 
employer offers a pension scheme in workplace are presented in Column 1 of Table 2.1. In 
both datasets, this proportion is monotonically and strictly increasing with the number of 
employees in the employing firm (Panel A and Panel B). In Column 2, we observe that, 
conditional on workplace pension provision, the proportion of workers that opt to join the 
scheme is also increasing. Membership rates are around 0.70 among workers employed by 
firms in the lowest range of number of employees, while in the highest range proportions 
are above 0.83. In sum, the information contained in both columns suggests a consistent 
association between an employer’s payroll, workplace pension provision and membership 
rates.  
Personal plan membership decreases as participation in workplace plans increases, 
as expected, due to the natural substitution between these two pension products. Column 3 
of Table 2.1 shows that, conditional on workplace pension provision, the proportion of 
workers that contribute to a personal pension plan changes ranges from around 0.17 in 
firms with a small number of workers to around 0.10 in the largest employers. Differently, 
the proportions in Column 4 show a positive association between the number of employees 
in the workplace and the practice of non-pension savings in the form of financial wealth 
accumulation among those who are offered a workplace pension scheme. Figures 2.1 and 
2.2 compare the average personal pension plan membership and practice of financial 
savings between the groups of members and non-members of workplace schemes. 
Workplace plan membership is negatively related to the demand for personal pensions, and 
positively related with practice of financial savings. Such associations suggest that the 
effect of workplace pensions on other savings could possibly be identified through the 
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variability induced by the observed employer’s payroll size, which is addressed in the next 
section. 
 
TABLE 2.1 
Proportions of key variables by number of employees in the workplace 
Panel A: British Household Panel Survey (Waves 2-18) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Wealth and Assets Survey (Waves 2-3) 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 95. 
 
Member of 
workplace 
pension scheme
Has personal 
pension       
Saves from 
current income      
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Number of employees in 
the workplace
1 - 2 0.300 0.707 0.184 0.577
3 - 9 0.396 0.644 0.163 0.529
10 - 24 0.558 0.659 0.157 0.531
25 - 49 0.685 0.697 0.158 0.534
50 - 99 0.760 0.718 0.147 0.549
100 - 199 0.808 0.735 0.151 0.560
200 - 499 0.866 0.745 0.122 0.553
500 - 999 0.901 0.796 0.121 0.578
1000 or more 0.936 0.833 0.106 0.578
Number of individuals 16,816
Number of observations 99,351
12,676
68,284
Employer offers 
a pension 
scheme
Conditional on [1] = Yes
Member of 
workplace 
pension scheme
Has personal 
pension       
Saved in the last 
2 years
a
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Number of employees in 
the workplace
1 - 10 0.333 0.718 0.171 0.632
11 - 24 0.512 0.747 0.143 0.621
25 - 49 0.623 0.798 0.137 0.610
50 - 249 0.752 0.819 0.124 0.653
250 - 499 0.809 0.826 0.133 0.647
500 or more 0.885 0.903 0.107 0.683
Number of individuals 20,385 8,412
Number of observations 26,870 12,270
Conditional on [1] = YesEmployer offers 
a pension 
scheme
13,292
17,417
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FIGURE 2.1 
 
Rates of personal pension plan membership among those who are offered a workplace pension 
BHPS – Has a personal pension plan: Yes = 1, 0 otherwise WAS - Has a personal pension plan: Yes = 1, 0 otherwise 
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FIGURE 2.2 
 
Rates of saving practice among those who are offered a workplace pension 
BHPS - Saves from current income: Yes = 1, 0 otherwise WAS – Saved in the last 2 years: Yes = 1, 0 otherwise 
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2.2 Empirical strategy 
In order to identify the effect of workplace pension provision on other saving 
attitudes we would like to estimate the following panel equation: 
Pr [𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 1] = ϕ(𝛼 + 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽X𝑖𝑡)  (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 is worker’s i outcome k indicating whether he practices other forms of savings 
at time t; 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable denoting whether the worker’s employer provides a 
pension scheme in the workplace; X𝑖𝑡 is a vector of  socio-demographic and job 
characteristics; and ϕ(•) is a cumulative distribution function. In reality, employees do not 
become members of workplace pensions by random assignment, so the parameter of 
interest, 𝛿, cannot be consistently estimated, i.e., we cannot deduce it directly from the 
joint distribution of 𝑦 and X using observational data. 
In our descriptive statistics, we saw that employers’ payroll size in number of 
employees is correlated with workplace pension provision, the endogenous regressor. 
Hence, in our identification strategy we exploit this variability induced by the employer’s 
payroll size to claim that the number of workers at the workplace is a sufficiently 
exogenous instrumental variable that allows us to identify the causal effect of workplace 
pensions on other forms of savings. This is in line with the idea that a reasonable 
instrument is uncorrelated with the outcome variable for reasons beyond its effect on the 
endogenous covariate (Angrist and Krueger, 2001, p. 72), and sufficiently correlated with 
the endogenous covariate for reasons the researcher can verify and explain. 
In terms of functional form, a robust estimation of the parameter of interest, 𝛿, can 
be obtained with a linear instrumental variable estimate, such as a two-stage least squares - 
2SLS, for the binomial endogenous regressor, 𝑝. A 2SLS estimation of Equation 1 can be 
represented by the following pair of equations: 
Pr [𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 1] = 𝛼1 + 𝛾1N𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1X𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 (2) 
Pr [𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 1] = 𝛼2 + 𝛿?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2X𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is a vector of dummies identifying the number of employees at workplace in 
ranges (as described in Table 2.1); and ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is the linear prediction for the likelihood of 
pension provision conditional on N and X. 
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The first stage regression is defined by Equation 2, which generates ?̂?𝑖𝑡. Equation 3 
represents the second stage, in which we regress the outcome of interest on the estimated 
predictions for provision ?̂?𝑖𝑡 obtained in the previous step. As indicated by Angrist and 
Krueger (2001, p. 80), even if the underlying second-stage relationship is nonlinear, a 
linear instrumental variables estimate captures the average effect of interest for a binomial 
endogenous regressors (Chesher, 2010; Chesher and Rosen, 2013). For cases where the 
particular outcome of interest is not binomial, but continuous, we can modify the linear 
probability model represented in Equation 1, substituting Pr [𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 1] for simply 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡. The 
2SLS estimation represented by Equations 2 and 3 generates a consistent estimate for the 
parameter of interest, 𝛿, which is initially called as the local average effect of provision 
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994), when the second stage regression error 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 is uncorrelated 
with the instrumental variable, N𝑖𝑡, used in the first stage. 
Because provision is supposed to affect the outcomes of interest only for those ones 
that actually become members of a workplace pension scheme, we also test the relevance 
of our instrument to identify the effect of membership on the outcomes of interest. For this, 
we substitute 𝑝𝑖𝑡 by 𝑚𝑖𝑡, where the latter is a binomial variable indicating whether the 
worker has saved in a workplace scheme, to get the corresponding second stage regression 
as: 
Pr [𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 1|𝑝 = 1] = 𝛼2 + 𝛿?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2X𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡  (4) 
Within subjects fixed effects are used to estimate Eq. 2-4 only in the BHPS sample. This is 
followed to avoid generating bias estimates, as exposed by Nickell (1981), due to the 
“large N, small T” characteristic of our WAS sample. 
To claim that these estimates are also an informative description of the whole 
population response to a given treatment, for instance, the impact of a large policy change 
in workplace pension schemes provision and/or membership, we need to discuss the 
support of the vector of categorical instruments Nit. Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show 
that both the average causal treatment effect of the treatment and LATE are averages of the 
marginal treatment effect - MTE over different subsets of the instrumental variable 
support, or subpopulations (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In our case, for the identification 
of provision effect, the MTE can be described as: 
MTE =  
𝜕E[𝑦|X,N]
𝜕Pr[𝑝=1|X,N]
   (5) 
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In this sense, LATE is the average of MTE over only an interval of N where 
provision rates differ. The estimate of the population average treatment effect – ATE is the 
expected value of MTE over the full support of N, including where the probability of 
provision/membership is (close to) zero or one. This is equivalent to the overlap or 
matching assumption, which is necessary for identifying some population measures of 
impact (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005): 
0 < Pr[𝑝 = 1|X, N] < 1  (6) 
The matching assumption requires that, conditional on X and N, there are both provided 
and no provided cases, and the same would be required when we instrument membership 
instead of provision. This assumption ensures there is overlap between the treated and 
untreated subsamples: for each case with  𝑝 = 1 there is another matched case with similar 
likelihood to be provided with (member of) a workplace pension scheme with 𝑝 = 0. 
Because this assumption can be observed in the output of our first stage estimation in Eq. 
(2), we should address it in our further analysis too. 
2.3 Main results and further analysis 
Our empirical analysis starts by obtaining the 2SLS estimates for the effect of 
workplace pension provision on other savings. We also present the OLS estimate of the 
same effect as a means of comparison. Tables 2.2a and 2.2b show that when workers are 
provided a pension scheme within their workplaces they are significantly less likely to 
declare themselves as members of personal pensions. The expected substitution effect 
between these two types of pension savings is then verified in both BHPS and WAS data, 
for instance, it is estimated as a decrease of 6.4 and 21.6 percentage points, respectively. 
Notwithstanding, the attitude to put something away in a bank’s saving account or 
investment seems to not be substituted by workplace pension provision. In fact, when there 
is a significant effect, it is actually a positive one, for example, equal to 12.8 percentage 
points in the 2SLS estimation. These results are in line with previous correlational studies 
showing that conventional financial savings are usually formed for precautionary motives, 
not usually to support retirement goals (e.g. Guariglia and Markrose, 2000). 
The same patterns of results are obtained when we instrument workplace pension 
membership and restrict the sample to include only those observations of workers that are 
offered a pension scheme within the workplace. Tables 2.3a and 2.3b show that when 
workers are members of a workplace pension scheme they are significantly less likely to 
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declare to be members of personal pensions, but not less likely to save in other non-
pension financial vehicles. For example, the marginal effect of membership on personal 
plan participation estimated by 2SLS in the BHPS and WAS samples are, respectively, 
negative in 22.9 and 29.6 per cent. When the outcome variable is the probability of saving 
from income in other non-pension financial vehicles, the marginal effect is positive in both 
samples, but statistically significant only in the WAS sample, and equal to 21.7 per cent. 
 
TABLE 2.2 
 
Marginal effect of workplace pension provision on other savings 
 
a. BHPS (Waves 2-18) 
 
 
b. WAS (Waves 2-3) 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 95. 
 
 
  
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Employer offers a pension scheme -0.018 -0.064 0.018 0.038
[0.004]*** [0.018]*** [0.001]*** [0.026]
Number of individuals 16,421 13,756 16,421 13,756
Number of observations 95,191 92,526 95,191 92,526
Saves from current Has personal pension       
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Employer offers a pension scheme -0.105 -0.216 0.087 0.128
[0.006]*** [0.017]*** [0.010]*** [0.025]***
Number of individuals 15,849 15,849 12,348 12,348
Number of observations 16,521 16,521 12,681 12,681
Has personal pension       Saved in the last 2 years
a
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TABLE 2.3 
 
Marginal effect of workplace pension participation on other savings conditional on 
provision 
 
a. BHPS (Waves 2-18) 
 
 
b. WAS (Waves 2-3) 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 95. 
 
In sum, the main results for the regression analysis are broadly similar to the 
insights we found from the unconditional approach in descriptive statistics presented in 
Section 2. One example of this is the comparison between the estimated marginal effect of 
workplace pension membership among those who are offered a scheme by the employer 
presented in Table 2.3 and the information illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In both, 
workplace plan membership is observed as negatively related to the demand for personal 
pensions, and positively related with the practice of financial savings.  
The tests of over-identifying restrictions, here denoted by the Hansen’s J statistic 
(Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007), show that J is far from rejection of its null in all 
cases, giving us greater confidence that our instrument set, bands of number of employees 
in the workplace, is exogenous. Also, tests of under-identification and weak-identification 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Member of workplace pension scheme -0.048 -0.229 0.027 0.179
[0.007]*** [0.099]** [0.008]*** [0.140]
Number of individuals 12,378 9,959 12,378 9,959
Number of observations 65,500 63,081 65,500 63,081
Has personal pension       Saves from current 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Member of workplace pension scheme -0.073 -0.296 0.060 0.217
[0.009]*** [0.071]*** [0.014]*** [0.091]**
Number of individuals 10,037 10,037 7,964 7,964
Number of observations 10,393 10,393 8,128 8,128
Has personal pension       Saved in the last 2 years
a
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of instruments are presented within the ‘first stage’ results in Appendix B and C. These 
tests ensure what was suggested previously in the descriptive statistics: that the instrument 
is also sufficiently correlated with the variables of interest, provision and membership. 
In order to further analyse the effect of workplace pension schemes, we extend the 
analysis to other proxies for non-pension financial savings available in BHPS and WAS. 
For example, in the BHPS:  
“About how much on average do you personally manage to save a month?”  
And, from WAS:  
“What is the approximate net amount that you have added to your savings accounts 
and investments in the last two years? (By net amount I mean the amount that you 
have added minus any amounts that you have withdrawn over this period.)”.   
Hence, we use the question from BHPS to estimate the impact on self-reported 
monthly savings in real amounts of British Pounds, while the question from WAS, due to 
its categorical nature, was recoded as a binomial outcome, to indicate the occurrence (or 
not) of net additions to savings accounts and investments. 
The effect of workplace pension plan provision on individual monthly savings, 
according to the 2SLS estimate, is slightly negative but not statistically different than zero. 
Table 2.4a summarizes the results, providing also the OLS estimate and the test for the 
over-identification of instruments. Similarly, Table 2.4b shows that we observe no effect 
on real monthly savings also when we instrument membership instead of provision, and 
restricting the sample only to observations of workers who are offered a workplace pension 
scheme. 
  
52 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.4 
 
a. Marginal effect of workplace pension plan provision on individual monthly 
savings 
 
 
 
b. Marginal effect of workplace pension plan participation on individual monthly 
savings conditional on provision 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 96. 
 
Differently, Table 2.5a and 2.5b show that both provision and membership have 
significant effects on the probability of individuals adding net amounts to savings accounts 
and investments. For example, provision increases the likelihood of such savings, on 
average, in 7.2 percentage points; while membership among those who are offered a 
workplace pension scheme is expected to increase the same probability in 25.7 percentage 
points. 
 
 
 
OLS 2SLS
[1] [2]
Employer offers a pension scheme -2.860 -1.305
[1.617]* [8.160]
Number of individuals 16,249 13,508
Number of observations 91,662 88,921
Real montlhy savings (in £)
OLS 2SLS
[1] [2]
Member of workplace pension scheme 2.068 35.763
[2.592] [51.980]
Number of individuals 12,214 9,738
Number of observations 62,948 60,472
Real montlhy savings (in £)
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TABLE 2.5 
 
a. Marginal effect of workplace pension plan provision on net investment 
practice 
 
 
 
b. Marginal effect of workplace pension plan participation on net investments 
practice 
 
            Notes on tables are presented from page 97. 
The robustness of our instrument N𝑖𝑡  passes the identification test not only when we 
use two different datasets, but also different outcomes. As highlighted in our empirical 
strategy, the instrumental variable model with binomial outcome represented by Equations 
(2) and (3) generates a consistent estimate for the parameter of interest 𝛿, which is the 
estimate for the “local” average treatment effect - LATE (Angrist et al., 1996; Chesher and 
Rosen, 2013). We initially qualify it as “local” because, in general, it captures the causal 
effect on the compliers, i.e., those individuals that are induced to participate in the 
treatment as a result of a variation in the instrument (Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Angrist 
and Krueger, 2001).  
 
OLS 2SLS
[1] [2]
Employer offers a pension scheme 0.036 0.072
[0.012]*** [0.029]**
Number of individuals 10,079 10,079
Number of observations 10,101 10,101
Has added a net amount to 
investments in the last 2 years
OLS 2SLS
[1] [2]
Member of workplace pension scheme 0.036 0.257
[0.017]** [0.105]**
Number of individuals 6,866 6,866
Number of observations 6,875 6,875
Has added a net amount to 
investments in the last 2 years
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2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have analysed the effect of workplace pension schemes 
provision and participation on other individual financial savings, such as personal pension 
plans and financial assets. Using data from two national surveys from the United Kingdom, 
we focused on the time period that the decision to provide a scheme in the workplace was 
still an employer’s decision and not mandatory for all firms in the United Kingdom, as it 
became after the reform legislated by the Pensions Act 2008. We originally exploited the 
fact that the chance of an employee to work for a firm which offers a pension scheme 
increases monotonically with the corresponding number of co-workers. This variability in 
workplace pension scheme provision generated by payroll size was shown to be a 
sufficiently exogenous instrumental variable, allowing us to point identify the causal effect 
of workplace pensions on other forms of saving attitudes. Hence, in addition to the causal 
inference aimed by this study, it also has the methodological contribution of presenting a 
valid instrumental variable that can be used in future research designs. Extensions of the 
present empirical strategy could be potentially applied to the analysis of more specific 
continuous measures of savings, and to individual finances administrative data. 
Overall, we found no evidence that providing employees with access to workplace 
pension schemes would make them less likely to save through non-pension financial 
instruments. While workplace schemes and personal plans are reasonably interchangeable 
pension products, other non-pension financial savings seem not to be affected. This result 
is in line with previous studies using British data which showed that contributions to 
pension plans and conventional savings do not offset each other completely (Guariglia and 
Markrose, 2000); and that they even might occur simultaneously (Crossley and O’Dea, 
2010). Given a sufficient covariate similarity between the British samples used in the 
present study and samples from other target populations (Bisbee et al, 2015), our findings 
support the idea that the estimated local average effects could be extrapolated to describe 
the potential impact of national reforms based on universal provision and/or membership 
of workplace pension schemes. As a consequence, this study builds on the literature which 
supports the pertinence of workplace pension schemes in the apparatus of national pension 
systems. 
 The present analysis puts the wide reforms in pension’s legislation implemented by 
countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in a 
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favourable position to sustain financial preparation for retirement. This is of particular 
interest of other international policymakers who are currently dealing with the 
consequences of ageing population on governmental expenditures and the insolvency risk 
of pay-as-you-go national pension systems. Policy alternatives could enforce universal 
provision of workplace pension plans in every workplace. In this case, the access to a 
pension plan is facilitated and contributions are directly deducted from employment 
earnings, but the employee still have to actively decide whether to opt-in a scheme offered 
by the company (Carrol et al., 2009; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004; Keller et al, 2011). We 
have shown here that when a worker opts-in, this does not significantly affect other non-
pension saving practices. This might be preferred to “one-nudge-fits-all” impersonal 
defaults options when individual characteristics are very heterogeneous, or when 
libertarian-paternalistic government interventions are infeasible, undesirable or unethical 
(Sunstein, 2013; Arad and Rubinstein, 2015; Sunstein, 2015; Reisch and Sunstein, 2016; 
Jung and Mellers, 2016). 
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2.5 Appendix 
Appendix 2.A 
Questions related to workplace pension plan provision and membership, personal 
pension plan membership, and other savings in the BHPS:  
a) Does your present employer run a pension scheme or superannuation 
scheme for which you are eligible? [Yes, No, Don’t know] 
b) Do you belong to your employer's pension scheme? [Yes, No, Don’t know] 
c) I'd like to ask you now about private personal pensions, that is a pension 
that you yourself have taken out on your own behalf. In the past year, that is 
since [Date] have you paid any contributions or premiums for a private 
personal pension, or had such contributions paid on your behalf by the 
Department for Work and Pensions? [Yes, No, Don’t know] 
d) Do you save any amount of your income for example by putting something 
away now and then in a bank, building society, or Post Office account other 
than to meet regular bills? Please include share purchase schemes, ISA's 
and Tessa accounts. [Yes, No, Don’t know] 
 
Questions related to workplace pension plan provision and membership in the 
WAS: 
a) Can I just check, does your employer offer access to an occupational 
pension scheme or superannuation scheme? [Yes, No, Don’t know]. 
b) Are you eligible to belong to your employer’s occupational pension 
scheme? [Yes, No, Don’t know]. 
c) Are you a member of the pension scheme? [Yes, No, Don’t know]. 
d) Personal pension membership is identified by a derived variable Whether 
has a personal pension [Yes, No, Don’t know]. 
e) Now thinking about all of your savings and investments, in the last two 
years, have you added any money to your savings and investments? [Yes, 
No, Don’t know]. 
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Appendix 2.B 
 
Predictors of workplace pension plan provision and membership - BHPS sample 
 
Notes: Estimates obtained from the first stage regression represented by Equation (2). Standard errors 
clustered at the individual level shown in the ride side of the coefficients. All estimates include within 
subjects fixed-effects and dummy variables indicating time (survey wave) effects. Other covariates included 
in the estimation were: (i) measures of (log transformed) real monthly earning and (log transformed) annual 
equivalized household net real income; and (iii) individual and household characteristics such as age in years, 
education level, household type (married couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether pays 
rent, own home etc). 
  
Employer offers a 
pension scheme
Member of workplace 
pension scheme
[1] [2]
Number of employees in the workplace
1 - 2 [Base ] [Base ]
3 - 9 0.060 0.011 -0.009 0.018
10 - 24 0.127 0.012 -0.023 0.018
25 - 49 0.190 0.012 -0.02 0.019
50 - 99 0.240 0.012 -0.004 0.019
100 - 199 0.270 0.012 0.003 0.019
200 - 499 0.307 0.013 0.018 0.019
500 - 999 0.322 0.013 0.035 0.019
1000 or more 0.318 0.013 0.044 0.019
Private firm -0.199 0.008 -0.145 0.011
Job type
Professional [Base ] [Base ]
Managerial and Technical -0.006 0.009 -0.019 0.009
Skilled non-manual 0.003 0.010 -0.028 0.011
Skilled manual -0.050 0.011 -0.024 0.012
Partly skilled -0.048 0.011 -0.032 0.013
Unskilled -0.072 0.015 -0.041 0.023
Armed forces -0.053 0.040 0.113 0.043
Full time job 0.020 0.006 0.015 0.008
Permanent contract 0.167 0.008 0.167 0.012
Underindentification of instruments
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 958.265 61.349
Chi-squared(8) p-value [0.000] [0.000]
Weak identification of instruments
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 448.834 19.371
Number of individuals 13,756 9,959
Number of observations 92,526 63,081
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Appendix 2.C 
 
Predictors of workplace pension plan provision and membership - WAS sample 
 
Notes: Estimates obtained from the first stage regression represented by Equation (2). Standard errors 
clustered at the individual level shown in the ride side of the coefficients. Estimates include dummy variables 
indicating time (survey wave) effects. Other covariates included in the estimation were: (i) measures of 
individual  and household income; and (ii) individual and household characteristics such as gender, age in 
years, education level, household type (married couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether 
pays rent, own home etc).  
 
 
  
Employer offers a 
pension scheme
Member of workplace 
pension scheme
[1] [2]
Number of employees in the workplace
1 - 10 [Base ] [Base ]
11 - 24 0.151 0.011 0.033 0.016
25 - 49 0.264 0.011 0.063 0.015
50 - 249 0.364 0.010 0.077 0.013
250 - 499 0.412 0.013 0.092 0.016
500 or more 0.467 0.011 0.150 0.014
Responsible for supervising 0.032 0.007 -0.011 0.008
Full time job 0.070 0.008 0.046 0.010
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 2,141.708 160.568
Chi-squared(8) p-value [0.000] [0.000]
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 491.128 32.514
Number of individuals 15,849 10,037
Number of observations 16,521 10,393
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Chapter 3 
Non-cognitive skills and the economic role of home 
production at retirement 
 
There is an empirically well-documented reduction in household consumption 
expenditure at retirement (Hamermesh, 1984, Mariger, 1987; Robb and Burbidge, 1989; 
Banks et al., 1998; Bernheim et al., 2001; Schwerdt, 2005; Haider and Steohens, 2007; 
Battistin et al., 2009; Miniaci et al., 2010). This sharp drop in expenditures was referred as 
a puzzle (Banks et al., 1998) given the implications of the life-cycle hypothesis (Blundell 
at el. 1994) which states that individuals would save for retirement aiming to smooth 
consumption across the life span. However, a body of literature suggests this can be 
explained by the fact that a decline in spending at retirement is usually related to food and 
work-related shopping (Hurst, 2008). Also, these monetary expenditure measures do not 
necessarily correspond to an actual food intake reduction, because retirees substitute 
market goods and services for “do-it-yourself” and economically rewarding domestic 
chores, for example preparing meals at home (Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013).  This 
literature also documents the existence of a substantial heterogeneity in spending changes 
at retirement, across consumption categories and in the time new retirees devote to 
housework tasks. 
Recent empirical analyses try to explain this heterogeneity with gender differences 
and social norms associated to couples’ division of labour (Stancanelli and Soest, 2012; 
Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013; Ciani, 2016; Bonsang and Soest, 2015). Alternatively, 
Auspurg et al (2015) using an experimental evidence on gender identity found little 
evidence of any systematic gender differences in the preference for housework, suggesting 
that the reasons for the observed division of domestic chores might lie elsewhere. 
Consequently, a major question remains not fully understood: what are the determinants of 
the heterogeneous changes in home production at retirement in terms of individual 
differences? Since its economic role is not only related to the rewarding aspects, but also 
with the costly nature of performing effortful and time demanding tasks, preferences for 
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doing housework might be driven by individual characteristics that go beyond gender, 
marital status, and health conditions. 
Individual psychological differences in the form of non-cognitive skills like 
conscientiousness, self-control, interpersonal abilities, motivation, and creativity, generally 
not captured by conventional cognitive ability tests of intelligence and memory, have been 
shown as important determinants of individuals’ economic behaviour (Heckman et al, 
2006; Borghans et al, 2008; Almlund et al, 2011; Heckman, 2011). When classified 
according to the Five-Factor model of personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) - openness to 
experience (appreciation for ideas), conscientiousness (the need for achievement, self-
discipline, and planned behavior), extraversion (seek out for social stimulation), 
agreeableness (interpersonal sensitivity) and neuroticism (emotional stability), these traits 
consist of high-order dimensions that determine individuals’ comparative advantages in 
terms of non-cognitive abilities, and shape their preferences, habits and situational actions. 
Consequently, in this study we build on the literature of retirement behaviour and the 
economic role of home-production by examining whether these non-cognitive skills 
determine the observed heterogeneous changes on the time individuals devote to 
housework due to a transition from the labour market to a retired status. 
Studies integrating non-cognitive skills and economic analysis have helped to 
explain individuals’ heterogeneous performances on economically rewarding activities and 
their reactions to changes in job market status. For example, in terms of remuneration, 
Nandi and Nicoletti (2014) found that openness to experience and extraversion are 
rewarded, while agreeableness and neuroticism are penalized. A negative relation between 
individual levels of agreeableness and wages was also identified by Heineck (2011). 
Conscientious individuals report more life satisfaction from increases in income (Boyce 
and Wood, 2011) but experience greater drops in life satisfaction due to unemployment 
(Boyce et al, 2010). Conscientiousness also predicts job performance (Hurtz and Donovan, 
2000), but conscientious workers who lack agreeableness may be ineffective, particularly 
in jobs requiring cooperative interchange with others (Witt et al., 2002). Recent evidence 
from Oerlemans and Bakker (2014) suggests that extraverts do not experience boosts in 
momentary happiness when spending time in merely pleasurable activities such as 
relaxing, watching TV, and reading. In fact, they report higher levels of satisfaction with 
life because they engage on motivationally salient and rewarding activities, e.g. physical 
exercises and economically rewarding work, especially when executed with others. These 
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facts might play a role at retirement not only because non-cognitive skills determine 
comparative advantages in task performances, but also because in the absence of paid work 
as at retirement, doing housework becomes a salient economically rewarding activity that 
allows individuals to save monetary income through home production. 
As predictors of personal achievement, success and satisfaction during working life, 
non-cognitive abilities were also identified as relevant determinants of retirement 
circumstances. Higher scores of agreeableness and conscientiousness, and lower scores of 
neuroticism have been shown as predictors of life satisfaction and positive experiences 
among retirees (Robinson et al., 2010). Higher levels of conscientiousness are more likely 
to be economically prepared for retirement, being potentially better at determining the 
optimal level of spending in a way that they have lower risk of outspending their resources 
before death (Hurd et al., 2012), with extraverted retirees presenting higher social activity 
due to their more outgoing nature (Lockenhoff et al., 2009). Recently, Kesavayuth et al. 
(2016) investigated how personality and gender impact well-being among retirees, and 
showed that retirement has a positive effect on leisure satisfaction for both males and 
females, but not necessarily life satisfaction and income satisfaction. While females’ have 
their well-being at retirement shaped by personality traits, the same does not seems to 
occur for males. In summary, previous empirical evidence allows us to hypothesise that 
new retirees’ attitudes towards housework might be shaped by non-cognitive skills, and 
thus might explain much of the observed heterogeneity. 
In order to perform the present analysis, we use British longitudinal data which 
includes individual measures of non-cognitive skills and responses about the amount of 
hours spent on an average week on housework tasks. Our empirical strategy identifies 
individuals who were in the labour market in a baseline period and made a transition to 
retirement in the follow-up period. Then, we estimate the average change in hours of 
housework (outcome variable) between both periods. To account for the endogeneity of 
retirement, we build a counterfactual scenario composed by observations of individuals 
with similar characteristics who stayed in the labour market during both periods. We 
describe the explanatory power of non-cognitive skills on new retirees’ actions towards 
housework and link them with observed consumption patterns. Our results report an 
increase in the number of hours devoted to housework tasks at the moment of retirement 
for both genders, mainly for cohabiting couples and individuals previously working full 
time. We show that the integration of non-cognitive skills into the empirical analysis helps 
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to explain heterogeneous changes in the number of hours devoted to housework at the 
moment of retirement in a degree similar to other factors previously documented in the 
literature. 
This chapter has four additional sections. In Section 1, we provide a conceptual 
framework and outline a simple two-period model of transition to retirement from the 
labour market which includes housework as a decision variable. We first study the inter-
temporal constraints of this model to later incorporate non-cognitive skills into retirees’ 
consumption decision problem. Then, Section 2 details the data and the empirical method. 
Section 3 presents the results and details how they contrast with previous empirical studies. 
Finally, Section 4 proposes some implications of this study and its conclusions. 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
Retirement is an important life transition in which a set of economic decisions are 
typically taken to reallocate income, consumption and time. For instance, labour income 
ceases to be a relevant part of individuals’ endowments and money inflows become 
exogenous, given the amount of savings previously accumulated. Consumption 
expenditures related to job activity, such as meals near the work place, transportation, 
clothing and training, lose relevance. After considering these exogenous factors, new 
retirees’ economic choices are still conditional on circumstances such as marital status, 
household type, and more specifically, individual differences like personal skills, 
preferences and habits. They are also expected to allocate at least part of their new 
endowment of time to housework, leisure and physical activities. Essentially, these 
decisions involve the transition process in which retirees reorient their lives from job-
related activities to more domestic ones. 
The analytical foundations for the study of household production and the allocation 
of time within the household were developed by Becker’s (1965) classic study (see 
Heckman, 2015). Therefore, the literature household production became solid (Muth, 
1966; Becker, 1981; Pollak and Wachter, 1975; Kerkhofs and Kooreman, 2003) and some 
attention have been given to the large potential impact of the inclusion of home-production 
on national accounts (see Stiglitz et al, 2009; and Bridgman et al, 2012). Although, the 
economic role of housework at retirement is still neglected in inter-temporal descriptive 
models of retirement behaviour (see Aguiar et al, 2012), being frequently omitted as a 
decision variable or as part of individuals’ life-time wealth (for example, Gustman and 
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Steinmeier, 2009; Laun and Wallenius, 2013). Aiming to fill this gap, we present a stylized 
two-period model of a transition to retirement from the labour market in which housework 
is part of the agent’s decision problem. To motivate the later empirical analysis, we study 
this model’s comparative statics and how non-cognitive skills might shape a retiree 
decision to do housework. 
3.1.1 Theoretical set-up 
In our setup, housework appears as a component of the agent’s inter-temporal 
constraints being part of life-time wealth. Assuming that non-cognitive skills determine 
individuals’ actions towards tasks that demand effort and ability, we incorporate 
personality traits to account for their effects not only on productivity but also on actions 
not related with the task’s output, such as when individuals denote utility directly from 
performing the task. 
First of all, time is discrete and individuals live for two periods. In the first period, 
they participate in the labour market and earn a fixed amount 𝑤𝑡, which they can either 
consume 𝑐𝑡 or save in a private savings account 𝑠𝑡 aiming to afford consumption 𝑐𝑡+1 later 
in life. Considering that the postponed consumption in the form of private savings is 
capitalized by a risk-free rate, 𝑟𝑡+1 and goods and services bought in the first period cannot 
be stored, real consumption in each period can be described by: 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡     (1) 
𝑐𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡    (2) 
Individuals have utility given by: 
𝒰(𝑐𝑡, 𝑐𝑡+1) = 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑢(𝑐𝑡+1)]    (3) 
where the period utility function 𝑢(∙) is increasing in consumption, reflecting the 
fundamental desire for more consumption; and 𝛽 denotes the individual subjective 
discount factor. Agents choose according to their period utility 𝑢(∙), satisfying the inter-
temporal budget constrain given by the combination of (1) and (2): 
𝑐𝑡 +
𝑐𝑡+1
1+𝑟𝑡+1
= 𝑤𝑡     (4) 
The equality described above can be interpreted as the life-time wealth of the 
individual. Individuals also might engage in home production of goods and services which 
they would have to buy in the market otherwise, e.g. cooking, cleaning, and doing laundry. 
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Housework levels are set given the comparative advantages individuals face in each period 
between paying for housework related items and producing them by themselves. 
In order to accommodate these additional features in the model, we propose that 
consumption in each period to be described: 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡   (1’) 
𝑐𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡+1  (2’) 
where  𝑧𝑡 and  𝑧𝑡+1 are potential new features induced by public policy or individual active 
choice. In the case when housework is a determinant of consumption in each period that 
cannot be stocked from period 1 to period 2, but might affect the decision of the working-
age individuals, we have that 𝑧𝑡 = ℎ𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑡+1. 
The inter-temporal budget constraint or life-time wealth can now be described by: 
𝑐𝑡 +
𝑐𝑡+1
1+𝑟𝑡+1
= 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡 +
𝑧𝑡+1
1+𝑟𝑡+1
    (4’) 
Note that the last term in the right hand side can be interpreted as the present value 
of a pension or the present value of home production of goods and services during 
retirement. We assume there are no governmental pension policies, but private savings. 
Individuals are able to postpone consumption by saving in the first period and to produce 
goods and services at home in both periods.  
In this sense, consumption in each period is described by: 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡 + ℎ𝑡      (1’’) 
𝑐𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡 + ℎ𝑡+1    (2’’) 
And life-time wealth given by: 
𝑐𝑡 +
𝑐𝑡+1
1 + 𝑟𝑡+1
= 𝑤𝑡 + ℎ𝑡 +
ℎ𝑡+1
1 + 𝑟𝑡+1
 
Now consider that 𝑐𝑡+1 − 𝑐𝑡 = ∆𝑐𝑡+1 and ℎ𝑡+1 − ℎ𝑡 = ∆ℎ𝑡+1, so we can also 
combine (1’’) and (2’’) to get: 
∆𝑐𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡 − (𝑤𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡) + ∆ℎ𝑡+1  (5) 
where (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡 is a proxy for the available income in t+1; −(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑡 is the 
part of real consumption in t from the purchase of market goods and services with money 
income. If an individual desires to smooth consumption during his transition to retirement, 
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not only savings, but also home production of part of his consumption in t+1 is a 
possibility, and this desire would be reflected in the utility function  in (2.3). In the same 
way, when the replacement rate of income during retirement is close to the unity, i.e., 
almost no drop in income, the individual is able to make use of his, now available, time 
endowment and substitute the purchase of market goods and services by home production. 
By isolating  ∆ℎ𝑡+1 we can observe that housework is expected to co-vary with real 
consumption changes, with available money income and with expenditures over market 
goods and services with money income in the first period. 
∆ℎ𝑡+1 = ∆𝑐𝑡+1 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡 + (𝑤𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡)   (6) 
There are also theoretical motivations for including personality traits as covariates 
in our empirical tests of the relationship between a transition to retirement and housework 
production. According to the comparative advantage based approaches suggested by the 
literature on the integration of personality measures in economic models (Heckman et 
al.,2006; Almlund et al., 2011; Heckman, 2011), non-cognitive skills in the form of 
personality traits determine individuals’ actions towards tasks that demand effort and 
ability.  
3.1.2   Incorporating non-cognitive skills into new retirees’ decision problem 
We incorporate personality traits to account for their effects not only on 
productivity but also on actions non-related with the task’s output, for instance when 
individuals denote utility directly from performing the task. 
First, we take equation (2’’), which represents consumption at retirement (second 
period) describing its now static constraints and drop time subscripts. Real monetary 
income is assumed as exogenous now and given by retirement savings, 𝑤 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡  
𝐶 = 𝑤 + ℎ     (7) 
where C is real consumption of final goods and services; 𝑤 is the exogenous flow of 
monetary income; and ℎ is home production of good and services to own consumption, or 
simply housework. In this sense, housework h can be described as a task 𝑗 which outcome 
depends on productivity 𝜑, which itself is a function of individual actions taken 𝑎𝑖 , traits 𝜃 
and effort 𝑒𝑗. 
ℎ = 𝜑(𝑎𝑖, 𝜃 , 𝑒𝑗),            𝑎 ∈ 𝒜, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾}, 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩, 𝑒 ∈ ℰ   (8) 
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We assume personality traits are individual endowments, and that choices are 
determined by traits and effort, as they affect productivity in tasks (Heckman, 2011). Effort 
is also an endowment and when it increases in one task it might diminish in another, 
leading to the restriction ∑ 𝑒𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 = ?̅?. Productivity is assumed to be increasing in effort. 
Effort can complement traits, 
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝜃′
> 0, or be a substitute to them, 
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝜃′
< 0. In order to 
generalize the notion of effort to a broader class of behaviours, let’s assume that actions 
themselves also depend on traits 𝜃, effort 𝑒𝑖, and situation 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, and let ℳ be the set of 
actions, including those ones not directly contributing to productivity.  
𝑎𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖(𝜃, 𝑒𝑖 , 𝑘),             𝑎 ∈ 𝒜 ∈ ℳ          (9) 
 Agents may not only have preferences over consumption of final goods and services, but 
also may value the output of the task, the effort and actions devoted to it in their own right. 
In this sense, the agent solves 
max   𝒰(𝑎, 𝐶, 𝜑, 𝑒)          s.t   (7)    (10) 
According to this setup, a transition to retirement is a situation s, which might affect 
housework given (6) and (7).  
Home production might co-vary with changes in the consumption basket, because it 
acts as a substitute for market goods and services like meals, cleaning and laundry. When 
there is no possible substitution, like in the case of some paid leisure activities 
(entertainment and travelling, for example), adjustments in housework levels allow them to 
economize the exogenous flow of income to pay for these expenditures. The inclusion of 
non-cognitive skills is due to their association with the actions taken in response to new 
constraints, endowments and incentives facing agents given their preferences (Heckman, 
2011, p. 20). Additionally to the effect of traits through consumption reallocation given a 
transition to retirement, there might be direct effects due to individuals having preferences 
over the actions taken during the task itself, including those ones not directly contributing 
to productivity, cooking or grocery shopping being typical examples.  
3.2   Data and empirical strategy 
We use longitudinal data from a nationally representative sample, the British 
Household Panel Survey – BHPS. Since its second wave, the BHPS has information on the 
amount of hours individuals spend on housework on average per week, e.g. time spent 
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cooking, cleaning and doing the laundry. In Wave 15, respondents were asked a set of 
fifteen questions, being three questions for each of the non-cognitive skill according to the 
Five-Factor model of personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992): openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Scores in each trait were 
measured by the participant’s average response to sets of three questions per trait, with 
answers ranging in a scale from 1 – “does not apply” to 7 – applies perfectly” (see 
Appendix). This fifteen-item questionnaire of the Five-Factor model of personality is a 
shorter inventory well suited for applications in large-scale multidisciplinary surveys 
which was shown to be robust across different survey methods (Lang et al, 2011) and 
strongly correlated with full versions for all Five-Factor scales (Donnellan and Lucas, 
2008). 
In order to assess the internal consistency of the answers given, we estimated the 
standardized alpha indexes under the assumptions of the measurement error model of 
Cronbach (1951). The reliability of the data is measured by the inter correlation among the 
test items, indicating the degree to which a set of questions measure the same trait as a one-
dimensional construct. The corresponding alpha indexes are situated at levels ranging from 
0.5112 for conscientiousness to 0.6750 to neuroticism respectively. These reliability levels 
are similar to ones obtained by Heineck (2007) and Nandi and Nicoletti (2009), who use 
the BHPS’s questionnaire, and to the ones obtained by Heineck and Anger (2010) and 
Boyce et al (2015), who use the German Socio-Economic Panel survey – SOEP, with a 
similar inventory of questions. Having checked the utility and reliability of the 
questionnaire, we also have to consider the constraints that personality data might impose 
to the sampling procedure. 
 The literature in psychology indicates that personality traits might change given 
life circumstances over the life-cycle (Costa and McCrae, 2006; Luhmann et al, 2014), 
imposing some restriction on its use in longitudinal studies.  First of all, we cannot make 
use of information on housework that was observed before wave 15, because life events 
that occurred earlier, e.g. marriage, unemployment, and disability, might have affected the 
development of a particular personality trait. For the same reasons, we shouldn’t rely on a 
larger number of periods after personality traits have been measured. Thus, we’ve selected 
an initial panel sample of individuals aged fifty-five or above: (i) who were in the labour 
market in a baseline period and transit to a retired status in a follow-up period, or (ii) who 
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stayed in the labour market in both periods, during waves 16 to 18, i.e., the last three 
BHPS’s waves. 
Our outcome variable, housework change, was built by taking the first difference of 
housework in hours per week for waves 16 to 18. Next, we identified extreme housework 
changes beyond the upper and lower outer fences of the distribution.  We defined a fence 
as the range outside of which an outlier exists, and calculated them according to the 
following expressions: 𝑓𝑙 = Q1 − 1.5(IQR) and 𝑓𝑢 = Q3 + 1.5(IQR), where 𝑓𝑙 and 𝑓𝑢 
represent the lower and upper quartile ranges, respectively; Q1 and Q2 represent the first 
and third quartiles, respectively; and IQR is the inter-quartile range (Q1 - Q3). After this 
adjustment, we obtained a sample of 3,674 individual-year observations. 
At the retired status, both men and women aged fifty-five or above have higher 
levels of housework compared with peers in the labour market. Table 3.1 has descriptive 
statistics for housework levels in the baseline and follow-up periods and the corresponding 
changes for both groups as well. Columns 1-3 show that while positive housework changes 
are frequent given a transition to retirement, in general there are no changes in the 
counterfactual group, as shown by Columns 4-6. By comparing the rows presenting 
housework statistics form men and woman, we can observe an average gender gap in 
levels of housework for those who stay in the labour force (8.49 hours) which persists 
given a transition to retirement (8.86 hours). These numbers highlight the relevant share of 
housework that is still done by women, a phenomenon consistent with the findings of Kan 
(2008, 2012), Gupta (1999) and Hersch and Stratton (2002) in samples of working-age 
individuals. 
In terms of household type, we see that increases in housework at retirement only 
occur significantly for individuals cohabiting with a spouse or partner. A similar situation 
occurs for those who were full time workers in the baseline period. Because they 
potentially devoted more time to job activities than part time workers, they show a larger 
increase in housework at the moment they leave the labour market.  In sum, these statistics 
by household type and full time versus part time workers are in line with the ones 
presented by Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz (2010, p. 6) in a sample of British workers. 
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TABLE 3.1 
 
Summary of statistics for housework 
Variable
Baseline Follow-up Change Baseline Follow-up Change
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All 9.964 11.462 1.799 8.898 8.891 -0.007
[0.414] [0.469] [0.352] [0.129] [0.131] [0.091]
Men 5.710 7.136 1.426 5.180 5.159 -0.021
[0.418] [0.493] [0.421] [0.110] [0.112] [0.092]
Women 13.769 15.995 2.186 13.640 13.650 0.010
[0.559] [0.634] [0.569] [0.200] [0.202] [0.170]
Cohabiting couples 9.368 11.522 2.154 8.757 8.742 -0.015
[0.482] [0.551] [0.392] [0.149] [0.151] [0.099]
Other household types 10.815 11.231 0.415 9.499 9.526 0.027
[0.748] [0.829] [0.786] [0.251] [0.244] [0.225]
Full time job (baseline) 7.882 10.621 2.739 7.219 7.247 0.028
[0.577] [0.692] [0.535] [0.133] [0.135] [0.097]
Part time job (baseline) 11.315 12.242 0.927 12.804 12.716 -0.088
[0.564] [0.633] [0.455] [0.262] [0.264] [0.203]
Individuals 316 316 316 1,488 1,488 1,488
Observations 318 318 318 3,356 3,356 3,356
Entered retirement Stayed in the labour market
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 97. 
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TABLE 3.2 
Domestic division of housework between cohabiting partners per type of activity 
Partner does/paid %
Men (Obs. = 1,986)
Grocery shopping 0.332 [0.035] 0.525 [0.012] -0.193 [0.037]***
Cooking 0.625 [0.036] 0.675 [0.011] -0.050 [0.037]
Cleaning/hoovering 0.592 [0.036] 0.704 [0.011] -0.112 [0.038]***
Washing and ironing 0.772 [0.031] 0.815 [0.009] -0.043 [0.032]
Women (Obs. = 1,394)
Grocery shopping 0.050 [0.018] 0.096 [0.008] -0.046 [0.020]**
Cooking 0.050 [0.018] 0.092 [0.008] -0.042 [0.020]**
Cleaning/hoovering 0.071 [0.022] 0.104 [0.009] -0.033 [0.024]
Washing and ironing 0.007 [0.007] 0.044 [0.006] -0.037 [0.009]***
Entered retirement            
[1]
Stayed in the labour 
market [2 ]
Difference (1-2)             
[3]
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 97. 
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Four out of five observations in both groups are related to co-habiting 
couples/partners. Therefore, we present statistics concerning how these couples share their 
time devoted to housework tasks. Table 3.2 shows the share of men and women indicating 
whether housework is mostly done by his/her partner or paid. Affirmative answers indicate 
a lack of contribution from the respondent to the total level of housework within a 
household. The negative values associated with the retirement effect in the last column 
denote that fewer new retirees respond that only a partner/spouse or paid help does the 
corresponding housework activity. Although, here we observe a gender gap in terms of 
division of housework for individuals in the labour market, which persists after a transition 
to retirement. 
Female participation increases in all activities except cleaning and hoovering, while 
men do not present average increases in cooking, washing and ironing. The largest gender 
gap occurs in washing and ironing activities, while the smallest is associated with grocery 
shopping. Indeed, these numbers suggest a slightly more equitable division of housework 
after one of the spouses retires and indicates that gender is a key determinant of individual 
reactions to a transition to retirement and housework. As pointed out by previous studies, 
in the modern society, retirement is not a passage associated only to male individuals 
anymore (Moen et al., 2001). Women experience housework differently as a consequence 
of their career and marital status (Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011) and of gendered 
expectations that pose a barrier to the equality of domestic division of labour (Kan, 2012). 
Household and individual characteristics expected to have influence on the outcome 
variable were included as covariates. Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics of these control 
variables for the group of interest and the counterfactual group.  We observe that both 
groups have equivalent hours devoted to housework in the baseline period when 
aggregating all members that cohabit, these averages being higher than 19.5 hours per 
week. The major differences in the two groups are in demographic characteristics such as 
gender and age, and labour market baseline characteristics like being a self-employed 
worker and having a full-time job. In terms of financial conditions, household income in a 
single person and multiple person households is not comparable in terms of expenditure 
power because of sharing rules and economies of scale between adults and children. Thus, 
we adjusted household income dividing it by the normalising factor provided in the BHPS, 
also known as equivalence scale. Other categorical variables like education and health 
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status, and geographical region and wave (both omitted from Table 3.3) were also included 
in the study. These groups’ covariates highlight the need to control for the biased 
composition of our counterfactual group in the empirical strategy later. 
The main estimating equation in this analysis is based on the following expression 
for housework: 
∆ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ρθ𝑖 + βX𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (11) 
where ∆ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the change in housework in hours per week of individual i at year t; 𝑘𝑖𝑡 is an 
indicator variable that assumes the value of one for the occurrence of a transition to 
retirement (treatment group) and zero if the individual stayed in the labour market in that 
particular year (control group); θ𝑖 is a vector of personality traits; X𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
individual and household characteristics; 𝑤𝑡 is a wave (time) fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term. The parameter of interest is  𝛿, which captures the main effect of retirement on 
housework. In other words, the parameter of interest captures how much time a person who 
stayed in the labour market would devote to housework if this person were to enter 
retirement. 
The explanatory power of the non-cognitive skills is obtained by estimating the 
marginal effects of the vector θ𝑖 conditional on k = {0,1}. In this sense, we have: 
∆ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑘=0 = α0 + 𝜌0θ𝑖 + 𝛽0X𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤0,𝑡 + 𝜀0,𝑖𝑡       (Stayed in the labour market)              (12) 
∆ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑘=1 = α1 + 𝜌1θ𝑖 + 𝛽1X𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤1,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿    (Entered retirement)                         (13) 
𝛿 = E[∆ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑘𝑖𝑡=1] − E[∆ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑘𝑖𝑡=0]          (Average causal effect of retirement)    (14) 
There are empirical advantages on the use this potential outcomes framework 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) to infer the causal effect of retirement on housework using 
observational data. First, it mitigates biases from comparisons over time in observation of 
individuals who entered retirement that could be the result of trends. Additionally, it 
overcomes biases in follow-up period comparisons between those who entered retirement 
and those in the control group that could be the result from permanent group differences 
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007). Most importantly, it allows us to analyse the extent to 
which non-cognitive skills in the form of personality traits moderates the time reallocation 
at the moment of retirement. 
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The framework described by equation (11) seeks to compare the observed 
housework change of a given individual entering retirement with a counterfactual 
prediction of housework change if the same retired individual had not in fact entered 
retirement. Given the fact that no individual can be observed in both situations, the 
literature about estimation of treatment effects emphasizes ways to build counterfactuals in 
observational studies (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006, p. 866). The OLS estimation of 
equation (3.1) neither control for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, nor for a potential 
correlation between a transition to retirement and the transitory error, 𝜀𝑖𝑡. Such a 
correlation arises if housework changes and the decision to retire are determined 
simultaneously.  
Furthermore, we cannot rely on a larger number of periods after personality traits 
have been measured, so our panel does not allow the implementation of fixed effects 
estimation without the cost of creating a correlation between the regressors and the error 
term biased results (Nickell, 1981).  Other dynamic panel data estimation procedures, for 
instance the ones proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) could not be applied in our case because of the absence of valid 
instruments or the violation of over-identifying restrictions. 
It is possible to implement a matching on propensity scores estimation (Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd, 1998), which entails obtaining matched sets of observations of 
individuals that performed a transition to retirement with observations of individuals who 
stayed in the labour market. Both sets of observations are then required to have similar 
probability of entering retirement (𝑘 = 1), in a given year and conditional on observed 
baseline characteristics x: 𝑝(𝐱) = Pr [𝑘 = 1|X = 𝐱], the so-called balancing condition 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.864). Matching on propensity scores method allows us to 
analyse the observational non-randomized data in question by mimicking the 
characteristics of a randomized control trial, and in this sense, reducing selection bias 
(Austin, 2011, p. 419). 
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TABLE 3.3 
 
Descriptive statistics of the covariates 
Variable
Lagged HH housework 19.519 [0.586] 19.736 [0.197]
Non-cognitive skills
O - Openess to experience -0.086 [0.058] 0.010 [0.017]
C - Conscientiousness 0.135 [0.054] 0.227 [0.016]
E - Extraversion -0.023 [0.054] -0.151 [0.017]
A - Agreeableness 0.091 [0.055] 0.003 [0.017]
N - Neuroticism -0.220 [0.054] -0.186 [0.016]
Demographics
Men 0.509 [0.028] 0.560 [0.009]
Age 63.305 [0.278] 59.835 [0.075]
Cohabiting couples 0.796 [0.023] 0.810 [0.007]
Labour  (baseline)
Self-employed 0.154 [0.020] 0.193 [0.007]
Full-time job 0.481 [0.028] 0.699 [0.008]
Financial conditions
Log equivalised HH income 10.134 [0.047] 10.321 [0.012]
Paying rent 0.091 [0.016] 0.096 [0.005]
Education and Health
Degree or higher 0.151 [0.020] 0.140 [0.006]
Further education 0.088 [0.016] 0.081 [0.005]
A level 0.129 [0.019] 0.181 [0.007]
O level 0.226 [0.024] 0.245 [0.007]
Other or no qualification 0.406 [0.028] 0.354 [0.008]
Health status (last 12 months) 2.119 [0.045] 2.032 [0.013]
Individuals 316 1,488
Observations 318 3,356
Entered retirement Stayed in the labour market
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 98. 
 
3.3   The effect of a transition to retirement on home production 
We start by presenting the ordinary least squares - OLS estimates of the average 
effect of a transition to retirement on the time individuals devote to housework tasks, 
which is equivalent to taking the first derivative of Eq. (11) with respect to  𝑆𝑖. Table 3.4 
shows that a transition to retirement from the labour market has a positive effect on 
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housework equal to 1.767 hours in a model with no covariates except lagged household 
housework hours and wave fixed-effects, and 1.768 hours in a model including all the 
other covariates.  
As a robustness check, we estimated the effect of retirement on housework 
applying different matching on propensity scores procedures: nearest neighbour one-to-ne, 
nearest neighbour twenty-to-one, radius caliper, and kernel. Exact match was applied on 
wave and on those covariates with large biases evidenced before in the descriptive 
statistics: cohabiting couple, full-time job in the baseline period and gender. Figure 3.1 
presents the standardizes percentage bias between the means of the groups of interest and 
the counterfactual across covariates. It shows that the required balanced condition between 
individuals that entered retirement and those who stayed in the labour force is satisfied, 
since the percentage biases across baseline covariates are not statistically different than 
zero in the matched sample. Table 3.5 shows that the corresponding estimates of the effect 
of retirement on housework are stable and, again, robustly similar to the OLS estimates. In 
general, these results are in line with the positive effect of retirement on time devoted to 
housework obtained by Luengo-Prado and Sevilla (2013) and Stancanelli and Soest (2012). 
These estimates corroborate with the application of matching on propensity scores 
as a robustness check to overcome the limitations of our data and also cover 
methodological gaps in the literature concerning the endogeneity of retirement. Existing 
evaluations of the retirement effect on time devoted to housework tasks relied on cross-
sectional estimates (for example Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013), used discontinuity 
designs to explore the exogenous source of variation around retirement age with respect to 
eligibility for a pension (for example Stancanelli and Soest, 2012; Ciani, 2016), or even 
aimed to control for unobserved characteristics by implementing fixed effects estimations 
(Bonsang and Soest, 2015). Our innovative application of the potential outcomes approach 
allows us to estimate the average causal effect of a transition to retirement using an 
individual’s change in housework hours as a sample unit and also link this with non-
cognitive skills and other individual characteristics to explain the present heterogeneity. 
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TABLE 3.4 
 
The effect of a transition to retirement on housework (OLS estimates) 
Dep. Variable = housework change [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Transition to retirement 1.767     1.757     1.777     1.791     1.748     1.768     
[0.350]*** [0.350]*** [0.352]*** [0.354]*** [0.356]*** [0.357]***
Non-cognitive skills No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour No No No Yes Yes Yes
HH Financial conditions No No No No Yes Yes
Health and education No No No No No Yes
Individuals 1,605     1,605     1,605     1,605     1,605     1,605     
Observations 3,674     3,674     3,674     3,674     3,674     3,674     
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 98. 
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       FIGURE 3.1 
 
                  Balancing condition after matching on propensity scores 
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TABLE 3.5 
 
The effect of a transition to retirement on housework (MPS estimates) 
Dep. Variable = housework change
Regression          
[1]
NN 1:1                
[2]
NN 20:1              
[3]
Radius (0.05)          
[4]
Kernel                 
[5]
Transition to retirement 1.768          1.990          1.776          1.871          1.870          
[0.357]*** [0.557]*** [0.388]*** [0.388]*** [0.390]***
Exact match on:
Wave (16-18) -              Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couple -              Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full-time job (baseline) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male -              Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched transitions -              317             317             312             312             
Observations 3,674          3,650          3,650          3,645          3,645          
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 98. 
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3.3.1 The influence of non-cognitive skills conditional on a transition to 
retirement 
The analysis of the marginal effects of non-cognitive skills conditional on a 
transition to retirement or permanence in the labour market gives us elucidating results. As 
shown in Table 3.6, for those individuals who entered retirement, there is a significant 
positive effect associated with extraversion that is robust across estimations with 
increasing levels of controls. Of all the personality explanation, Columns 1-6 shows that 
extraversion is a key determinant of the changes on the time new retirees devote to 
housework tasks, the more extroverted being the ones that present higher increases on 
housework hours due to retirement. For an additional standard deviation on the 
extraversion score, when we include the whole set of control variables, housework 
increases 0.873 hours on the top of the average effect of a transition to retirement. 
The positive and significant marginal effect of extraversion on housework for those 
entering retirement has two potential explanations. It could be explained by the fact that 
extroverts do less housework than the average while they are participating in the labour 
market, and then catch up with the average at retirement given their new time endowment; 
or extroverted new retirees simply start doing more hours of housework than the average 
individual at retirement. In order to test this, we estimated the marginal effect of each non-
cognitive skill on housework levels. We also repeated this procedure using consumption 
measures present in the dataset, such as eating-out and individual monthly leisure 
expenditures, and grocery and food household weekly bill, as dependent variables in order 
to check for the occurrence of expenditure patterns related with non-cognitive skills. 
Despite being proxies for real consumption choices and imperfect non-continuous (scale) 
measures of expenditures, they provide indicatives of the direction of the association 
between consumption per category and each non-cognitive skill conditional on a transition 
to retirement.  
Among those who stayed in the labour market, extraversion is negatively associated 
with housework hours and positively related with individual leisure and eating out 
expenditures, and household grocery and food bill. Table 3.7 in Columns 1-4 shows that 
the more extroverted devote less time to domestic chores than an average individual when 
still in the labour market, but catch up with the average when entering retirement. This 
finding is consistent with the observed positive relationship between extraversion and pre-
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retirement expenditures on socializing with others, and with the adjectives of extraverted 
people of being outgoing and oriented towards people. Additionally, this finding builds on 
evidence collected by Kesavayuth et al. (2016) using British data which shows that leisure 
satisfaction increases at retirement for both men and women.  
 
TABLE 3.6 
 
Marginal effects of non-cognitive skills on housework 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 99. 
  
Dep. Variable = housework change [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Stayed in the labour market 
O - Openess to experience 0.073 0.078 0.083 0.112 0.126 0.134
[0.082] [0.085] [0.085] [0.086] [0.088] [0.088]
C - Conscientiousness -0.140 -0.159 -0.163 -0.149 -0.145 -0.169
[0.091] [0.095] [0.095] [0.096] [0.096] [0.096]
E - Extraversion -0.089 -0.069 -0.063 -0.070 -0.074 -0.063
[0.078] [0.081] [0.081] [0.082] [0.082] [0.083]
A - Agreeableness 0.001 -0.009 -0.008 -0.019 -0.027 -0.029
[0.079] [0.082] [0.083] [0.083] [0.082] [0.082]
N - Neuroticism -0.122 -0.117 -0.117 -0.110 -0.112 -0.117
[0.078] [0.085] [0.085] [0.086] [0.088] [0.087]
Entered retirement 
O - Openess to experience -0.258 -0.211 -0.210 -0.199 -0.171 -0.124
[0.315] [0.314] [0.314] [0.313] [0.314] [0.310]
C - Conscientiousness 0.491 0.458 0.460 0.451 0.460 0.434
[0.419] [0.411] [0.411] [0.411] [0.411] [0.411]
E - Extraversion 0.985 0.874 0.877 0.878 0.887 0.873
[0.371]** [0.364]** [0.364]** [0.362]** [0.360]** [0.354]**
A - Agreeableness -0.151 -0.155 -0.158 -0.171 -0.172 -0.170
[0.397] [0.390] [0.390] [0.388] [0.390] [0.384]
N - Neuroticism 0.124 0.149 0.147 0.170 0.167 -0.117
[0.334] [0.334] [0.332] [0.330] [0.329] [0.328]
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH Financial conditions No No No Yes Yes Yes
Health and education No No No No Yes Yes
Wave 15 conditions No No No No No Yes
Individuals 1,605  1,605  1,605  1,605  1,605  1,605  
Observations 3,674  3,674  3,674  3,674  3,674  3,674  
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TABLE 3.7 
 
Marginal effects of non-cognitive skills on housework hours and consumption 
measures 
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 99. 
Stayed in the labour market
O - Openess to experience 0.291 0.099 -0.061 0.004
[0.160] [0.083] [0.084] [0.043]
C - Conscientiousness 0.175 -0.007 -0.179 0.012
[0.185] [0.084] [0.088]* [0.045]
E - Extraversion -0.366 0.292 0.421 0.141
[0.153]** [0.081]*** [0.076]*** [0.044]***
A - Agreeableness 0.045 -0.084 0.042 -0.010
[0.158] [0.096] [0.090] [0.044]
N - Neuroticism 0.153 -0.067 -0.035 -0.036
[0.178] [0.080] [0.081] [0.046]
Entered retirement
O - Openess to experience 0.454 -0.063 -0.142 -0.100
[0.401] [0.144] [0.161] [0.079]
C - Conscientiousness 0.262 0.030 0.053 -0.086
[0.487] [0.172] [0.193] [0.102]
E - Extraversion 0.092 0.008 0.102 -0.028
[0.402] [0.166] [0.180] [0.097]
A - Agreeableness -0.151 -0.351 -0.079 0.251
[0.491] [0.176]* [0.193] [0.107]**
N - Neuroticism -0.149 -0.137 -0.078 0.033
[0.417] [0.145] [0.185] [0.096]
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH Financial conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health and education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave 15 conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 1,610 1,610 1,613 1,614
Observations 3,690 3,681 3,701 3,709
 Housework 
(hours per 
week)             
[1] 
 Leisure 
expenditures 
(scale 0-12) 
[2] 
 Eating out 
expenditures 
(scale 0-12) 
[3] 
 Grocery 
and food  
(scale 1-12) 
[4] 
Dependent Variable
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FIGURE 3.2 
Predicted levels of housework and consumption expenditures 
 
a. Housework hours b. Grocery and food bill 
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FIGURE 3.2 (Continued) 
 
c. Leisure expenditures d. Eating out expenditures 
  
Notes: (i) the figure reports predicted levels of housework in hours, reported monthly leisure and eating out individual expenditures (scale 0-12) and 
reported weekly household grocery and food bill (scale 1-12), conditional on the occurrence of a transition to retirement or permanence in the labour 
market, across extraversion scores; (ii) for more information about the estimation porcedure, see notes from Table 3.7. 
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The graphical analysis of the predicted levels of housework and consumption 
measures across different levels of extraversion also helps to identify the pattern of time 
and consumption reallocation that happens at retirement. Figure 3.2 shows that household 
grocery and food bill and individual eating out expenditures decrease significantly due to a 
transition to retirement while housework hours increases, but leisure expenditures remain 
stable.  
There is consistency between these results and the adjectives of extraverted people: 
being pro-active, energetic, and oriented towards people, given that while in the labour 
market, these individuals’ expenditures on socializing with others, e.g. eating at restaurants 
and leisure activities, also show a positive association with extraversion. They are 
consistent also with the idea that pre-retirement entertainment habits, that cannot be 
produce at home, like travelling, going to a bar or to the movies, can be sustained by 
producing at home other goods and services that otherwise these new retirees would have 
to pay for, for example meals, laundry, cleaning, washing and gardening.  
3.3.2 The explanatory power of non-cognitive skills compared to other 
covariates 
In order to compare the explanatory power of the non-cognitive skill of 
extraversion with other covariates that showed to be relevant to explain the embedded 
heterogeneity, we present estimates of the effect of retirement conditional on: (i) gender, 
(ii) whether the household has cohabiting partners, (iii) whether the new retiree had a full 
time or part time job in the baseline period, and (iv) the individual having an extraversion 
level equal to one standard deviation above and below the average. Table 3.8 present these 
estimates showing that new retirees of both men and women are expected to increase their 
time devoted to housework activities respectively 1.298 hours and 2.249 hours per week. 
For an individual cohabiting with a spouse or partner, the average effect of a transition to 
retirement on housework is estimated as equal to 2.102 hours, while for individuals living 
in other types of households there is no significant effect. Individuals previously working 
full time are expected to make use of their extra endowment of time at retirement to 
increase housework on average 2.648 hours, while previously part-time workers are only 
expected to increase less than one hour per week. 
Comparing these estimates with the ones predicted for individuals with 
extraversion scores equivalent to one standard deviation above and below the mean, gives 
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us clear notion of the important role of extraversion. The estimated housework change at 
retirement is equal to 2.642 hours for those individuals with extraversion scores equal to 
one standard deviation above the average score, and only equal to 0.952 for those with an 
extraversion score equivalent to one standard deviation below the average score. These 
estimates suggest that the power of extraversion to explain the heterogeneity of housework 
at retirement to be as relevant as gender, the type of household that the individual lives and 
whether he had a full time job. 
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TABLE 3.8 
 
Heterogeneity by gender, household type, job type and extraversion 
Men Women Couples Others Part-time Full-time -1SD +1SD
Transition to retirement 1.298 2.249 2.102 0.300 0.897 2.648 0.952 2.642
[0.445]*** [0.553]*** [0.393]*** [0.778] [0.461]* [0.534]*** [0.532]* [0.497]***
Non-cognitive skills
Demographics
Labour
HH Financial conditions
Health and education
Individuals
Observations
Gender Household type Job type Extraversion
1,605
3,674
1,605 1,605 1,605
3,674 3,674 3,674
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
 
Notes on tables are presented from page 99. 
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3.4    Conclusions 
This study presented novel evidence that non-cognitive skills explain new retirees’ 
reallocation of time in favour of housework - a potential substitute for market purchases at 
the moment of retirement (Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013). We elaborate on literature 
that explains the sharp drop in consumption expenditures that occurs at retirement and was 
previously referred as a puzzle (Hurst, 2008; Banks et al., 1998) given the implications of 
conventional life-cycle models (Blundell at el. 1994). In particular, our study not only 
brings greater attention to the role of home-production as a decision variable in descriptive 
models of saving for retirement, but also highlights the relevance of individual differences 
to explain the heterogeneity present in new retirees’ economic behaviour. Although some 
empirical analyses explain part of this heterogeneity according to gender differences and 
social norms associated to couples’ division of labour (Stancanelli and Soest, 2012; 
Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013; Ciani, 2016; Bonsang and Soest, 2015),  recent 
experimental evidence on gender identity (Auspurg et al, 2015) has found little evidence of 
any systematic gender differences in the preference for housework, suggesting that the 
reasons for the observed preferences towards housework might lie beyond these factors. 
We show that the integration of non-cognitive skills into the empirical analysis 
helps to explain heterogeneous changes in the number of hours devoted to housework at 
the moment of retirement in a degree similar other factors previously documented in the 
literature, for example gender differences among cohabiting couples. The evidence 
provided here supports the predictions of a theoretical set-up that includes home-
production as part of an individual’s life-time wealth and integrates non-cognitive skills as 
components of individuals’ preferences over consumption and actions that affect how they 
accomplish effortful tasks conditional on a situation. At the moment of retirement, the 
reallocation of resources involving home-production and consumption presents an increase 
in the time devoted to housework tasks that is simultaneously accompanied by a decrease 
in expenditures that can be easily substituted by home-production, for instance eating-out 
at restaurants and grocery and food (also documented by Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013). 
However, individual expenditures that cannot be directly substituted by home production 
of goods and services, for example leisure expenditures, remain stable, suggesting that 
housework helps to substitute meals at restaurants and to economize money to sustain 
habits of leisure and social activity developed before retirement. 
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The trait of extraversion was shown as a key determinant of the changes in the time 
new retirees devote to housework tasks, which is also linked with preferences over 
consumption expenditures before retirement. When still in the labour market, more 
extroverted individuals devote less time to domestic chores than an average individual, and 
spend more of their income socializing activities like eating at restaurants and paying for 
leisure activities, consistently with the adjectives of the extroverted of being outgoing and 
oriented towards people. The “do-it-yourself” and economically rewarding nature of 
housework tasks might allow more extroverted retirees to sustain their pre-retirement 
levels of leisure and entertainment habits by acting as a substitute for other services that 
they otherwise would have to pay for, in line with previous evidence that extraverted 
retirees present higher social activity (Lockenhoff et al., 2009). Moreover, this insight 
corroborates with the evidence (Oerlemans and Bakker, 2014) suggesting that extraverts do 
not experience boosts in momentary happiness when spending time in merely pleasurable 
activities as relaxing, watching TV, and reading, but report higher levels of satisfaction 
with life because they engage on motivationally salient and rewarding activities, e.g. 
physical exercises and economically rewarding work, especially when executed with 
others. 
When considering retirement-savings adequacies and the mechanisms through 
which the ageing population cope with finances, policymakers in the field of pensions 
should account for the fact that an individual’s ability to perform housework tasks is part 
of life-time wealth and, as a consequence, it is an economic mechanism that act as a 
potential buffer for income shocks or unexpected replacement rates. In addition, non-
cognitive skills are personal abilities developed across the life span (Heckman, 2011) that 
also determine retirees’ personal outcomes. This implies that social care providers and 
policymakers in the area of housing need to better visualize the heterogeneity embedded on 
retirees’ personal characteristics when they spend more time at home. For example, Hayes 
and Finney (2014) reported the existence of a cluster of households composed by older 
members with constrained income that present a particularly high expenditure on food and 
non-alcoholic drinks, suggesting a preference for dining at home, entertaining others, or 
age-related dietary needs supplied at home. In summary, conditionally on personal 
psychological differences, home-production has the economic role of allowing retirees to 
sustain habits, preferences and desired standards of living. 
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3.5    Appendix 
The fifteen questions measuring non-cognitive skills were part of BHPS’s Wave 15 
self-completion questionnaire. Respondents were presented the following text. 
The following questions are about how you see yourself as a person. Please 
tick the number which best describes how you see yourself where 1 means 
'does not apply to me at all' and 7 means 'applies to me perfectly'. 
I see myself as someone who . . .  
a) Is sometimes rude to others 
b) Does a thorough job 
c) Is talkative 
d) Worries a lot  
e) Is original, comes up with new ideas  
f) Has a forgiving nature  
g) Tends to be lazy 
h) Is outgoing,  
i) Gets nervously easily 
j) Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
k) Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
l) Does things efficiently 
m) Is reserved 
n) Is relaxed, handles stress well 
o) Has an active imagination 
Questions e, j, and o related to openness to experience; b, g, and l relate to 
conscientiousness; c, h, and m relate to extraversion; a, f and k relate to agreeableness; and 
d, i, and n relate to neuroticism. Scores for each of the traits are obtained by aggregating 
across each of the three-items by trait after reverse codes for questions a, g, m, and n.  
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Conclusions 
 
This dissertation addressed workers’ preparation and adaptation to the economic 
circumstances of retirement. We highlighted that national pension systems in developed 
countries have incentivised workers to accumulate pension wealth through workplace 
pension schemes. This is expected to help nations face the consequences of the ageing 
population on governmental expenditures on social security and on the insolvency risk of 
national pension systems. Prudent regulation indicates that workers as the major target 
group within the modern multi-pillared typology towards pension system modalities 
suggested by international organizations like the World Bank, the OECD and the European 
Union (World bank, 1994; Willmore, 2000; Holzmann, 2000, 2012; OECD, 2006; 
Holzmann et al, 2008; Davies, 2013). 
The first two studies used longitudinal data of workers from the United Kingdom to 
empirically investigate the pertinence of enforcing workplace pension schemes as a policy 
mechanism to improve retirement savings adequacy. During the sample’s period (1992 to 
2012), automatic enrolment of employees into a workplace pension’s scheme was not a 
practice enforced by law, as it came later by the Pensions Act 2008’s legislation. Until 
2012, most British workers still had to actively choose to opt in workplace pension plans 
and the provision of such schemes was still a decision of employers. The first study found 
that providing workers with the opportunity to join a pension scheme at their workplace 
could generate a major impact on aggregate participation rates. Such success seems to not 
be conditional on the existence of policy rules concerning the way workers are enrolled or 
incentivized to join a scheme or whether the employing firm is of the public or private 
sector. In this sense, pension reforms could still obtain major impacts on participation rates 
by prescribing mandatory provision of pension schemes in every workplace while letting 
other components of a scheme to be determined privately by firms and workers. 
The predicted beneficial impact of universal provision of workplace schemes on 
aggregate participation rates is of particular interest of policymakers who desire to preserve 
some degree of individual choice autonomy (see Felsen et al., 2013; Arad and Rubinstein, 
2015; Hagman et al., 2015; Sunstein, 2015; Reisch and Sunstein, 2016; Jung and Mellers, 
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2016) while still helping the population to smooth consumption from work life into 
retirement and to mitigate poverty risks in old age. It has been also shown that libertarian-
paternalistic interventions like automatic enrolment might be helpful to reduce the time an 
employee takes to join a scheme, but they come with the cost of a “one-size-fits-all” 
impersonal default option that might not be appropriate due to heterogeneous 
characteristics of the population. 
While extending the provision of workplace pension schemes, with or without 
automatic enrolment, is expected to boost schemes membership rates, the effect on overall 
savings and individual attitudes towards other types of savings cannot be perfectly 
anticipated. For instance, an increase in workplace pension savings could be funded by a 
reduction in the amount households would save in other forms (Crawford et al, 2012). 
Hence, the second study estimated the causal effect of workplace pensions on other forms 
of savings, for example, personal pension plans and financial vehicles. The analysis hasn’t 
found evidence that providing employees with access to workplace pension schemes would 
make them less likely to save through non-pension financial instruments. While workplace 
schemes and personal plans are reasonably interchangeable pension products, other non-
pension financial savings seem not to be affected. Overall, the findings from the first two 
studies support the idea that earnings-related privately managed occupational pension 
schemes are a suitable mechanism in the apparatus of national pension systems, either as a 
mandatory tier or a voluntary pillar.  
These policy propositions on workplace plans could be empowered by further 
research making use of administrative data, instead of self-reported responses, of 
individual finances, and clearer information about a pension plan’s characteristics and the 
enrolment process faced not only by those workers who opted to join the scheme but also 
those who opted-out. For example, one of the limitations of the first study is that the 
characteristics of the pension plan offered to the employee are omitted in the data, e.g. 
whether there are matching contributions by the employer, how simplified the enrolment 
process is or which kind of occupational pension scheme is offered (defined benefit or 
defined contribution). Also, the causal effect of workplace pensions on other forms of 
savings could be identified by implementing the same instrumental variable estimation 
proposed in the second study, but with administrative data and a richer set of continuous 
measures of individual finances. The aforementioned instrumental variable was validated 
in this study in two British samples, but could be additionally extrapolated to surveys from 
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other countries to provide an informative description of their populations’ responses to 
pension reforms which enforce workplace pension schemes provision and/or membership. 
Workplace pension plans are part of the financial pillar to a better preparation for 
retirement, but the World Bank’s framework to assess pension systems and reform options 
(Holzmann et al, 2008) also considers a “non-financial pillar”. Hence, the third study of 
this dissertation assumed that home-production of goods is part of this pillar. It examined 
the fact that retirees devote more time than workers to economically rewarding “do-it-
yourself” housework tasks, for example, the preparation of food at home, cleaning, laundry 
and grocery shopping. In particular, this study highlighted the relevance of housework as a 
decision variable in descriptive models of saving for retirement. Therefore, an appropriate 
evaluation of retirement savings adequacies and the mechanisms through which the ageing 
population copes with finances, should account for the fact that an individual’s ability to 
produce goods and services at home is part of his life-time wealth. 
Additionally, the integration of non-cognitive skills into the empirical analysis 
helped to explain heterogeneous changes in the number of hours devoted to housework at 
the moment of retirement in a degree similar other factors previously documented in the 
literature, for example gender differences among cohabiting couples. This complements 
previous works in economics and psychology (Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013; Hayes and 
Finney, 2014; Kesavayuth et al, 2016) which inform policy choices for counselling 
programs for retirement and older individuals financial planning. 
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Table Notes 
 
Chapter 1 
Table 1.1: The initial panel of 89,760 person-year observations excludes 1,962 
observations (1,112 female and 850 male workers) in which employees responded “Don’t 
know” to question I, and another 102 observations (58 female and 44 female workers)  in 
which employees responded “Don’t know” to question II. Earnings are monthly, adjusted 
to real terms using quarterly Consumer Price Index ONS/UK (base = 100, average of 
2009), and log transformed. 
Table 1.2: Coefficients represent odds-ratios obtained from the estimation of Equation (2). 
Standard errors were clustered by individuals. Earnings are monthly and adjusted to real 
terms using quarterly Consumer Price Index ONS/UK (base = 100, average of 2009) and 
log transformed. Household income is gross annual equivalized by the number of 
household members, adjusted to real terms using quarterly Consumer Price Index ONS/UK 
(base = 100, average of 2009), and log transformed. The estimations also include wave and 
region identifiers as covariates. 
Table 1.3: Estimates shown in columns (2) to (7) were obtained by applying nearest 
neighbour one-to-one matching on propensity scores according to the rule presented in 
Equation (6). Column (1) presents the estimate for the unmatched sample. The standard 
errors shown inside brackets only reflect the after-matching sample size and variances (see 
Abadie and Imbens, 2015), but do not reflect the propensity score estimation. Radius 
represents a caliper distance in probabilistic measure; for example, the radius in column (2) 
means that only accepts as nearest-neighbour a case in which the propensity scores has a 
maximum difference of one per cent. Common support drops treatment observations 
whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity 
score of the counterfactual group. No replacement means that once a case in the 
counterfactual group is used to match another case in the group of interest, it cannot be 
used anymore. 
Notes to Table 1.5: Estimates shown in columns (2) to (7) were obtained by applying 
nearest neighbour one-to-one matching on propensity scores according to the rule 
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presented in Equation (6) only in cases of private sector workers. Column (1) presents the 
estimate for the unmatched sample. The standard errors shown inside brackets only reflect 
the after-matching sample size and variances (see Abadie and Imbens, 2015), but do not 
reflect the propensity score estimation. Radius represents a caliper distance in probabilistic 
measure; for example, the radius in column (2) means that only accepts as nearest-
neighbour a case in which the propensity scores has a maximum difference of one per cent. 
Common support drops treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the counterfactual group. No 
replacement means that once a case in the counterfactual group is used to match another 
case in the group of interest, it cannot be used anymore. 
Table 1.6: Coefficients represent odds-ratios obtained from the estimation of Equation (8). 
Standard errors were clustered by individuals. Earnings are monthly and adjusted to real 
terms using quarterly Consumer Price Index ONS/UK (base = 100, average of 2009) and 
log transformed. Household income is gross annual equivalized by the number of 
household members, adjusted to real terms using quarterly Consumer Price Index ONS/UK 
(base = 100, average of 2009), and log transformed. The estimations also include wave and 
region identifiers as covariates. The variable “Promotion opportunities” is binomial, 
indicating whether the worker self-reported having chances to be promoted in his job. The 
predicted short-term opt-in rate was obtained by averaging the predicted chance of each 
individual joining the scheme in the same year that provision started to be offered. The 
predicted likelihood of joining the scheme is given from the estimation of Equation (8) 
when all the covariates are at their average levels. 
Table 1.7: Coefficients represent odds-ratios obtained from the estimation of Equation (9). 
Standard errors were clustered by individuals. Earnings are monthly and adjusted to real 
terms using quarterly Consumer Price Index ONS/UK (base = 100, average of 2009) and 
log transformed. Household income is gross annual equivalized by the number of 
household members, adjusted to real terms using quarterly Consumer Price Index ONS/UK 
(base = 100, average of 2009), and log transformed. The estimations also include wave and 
region identifiers as covariates. The variable “Promotion opportunities” is binomial, 
indicating whether the worker self-reported having chances to be promoted in his job. The 
predicted short-term opt-in rate was obtained by averaging the predicted chance of each 
individual joining the scheme in the same year that provision started to be offered. The 
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predicted likelihood of joining the scheme is given from the estimation of Equation (9) 
when all the covariates are at their average levels. 
 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.1: In both Panels, Column 2 reports membership in defined benefit (DB) and 
defined contribution (DC) schemes. a See Appendix A for a detailed description of the 
questions. 
Table 2a: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in the brackets. *** p-
value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.10. All estimates include within subjects fixed-
effects and dummy variables indicating time (survey wave) effects. Alongside with the 
vector of indicator variables identifying the range of number of employees in the job place, 
other covariates included in the estimation were: (i) indicator variables denoting whether 
the employer is a private company, the job type (if managerial, skilled, armed forces etc), 
the contract type (full time, permanent); (ii) measures of (log transformed) real monthly 
earning and (log transformed) annual equivalized household net real income; and (iii) 
individual and household characteristics such as age in years, education level, household 
type (married couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether pays rent, own 
home etc). 
Table 2.2b: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in the brackets. *** p-
value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.10. In Columns 3 and 4, because the outcome 
variable refers to behavior “in the last two years” we used the lagged values of covariates, 
including for the instrument variable –number of employees in the workplace. Estimates 
include dummy variables indicating time (survey wave) effects. Alongside with the vector 
of indicator variables identifying the range of number of employees in the job place, other 
covariates included in the estimation were: (i) indicator variables denoting whether the 
worker is responsible for supervising, whether the job contract is of a full-time position; 
(ii) measures of individual  and household income; and (iii) individual and household 
characteristics such as gender, age in years, education level, household type (married 
couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether pays rent, own home etc).  
Table 2.3a: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in the brackets. *** p-
value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.10. All estimates include within subjects fixed-
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effects and dummy variables indicating time (survey wave) effects. Alongside with the 
vector of indicator variables identifying the range of number of employees in the job place, 
other covariates included in the estimation were: (i) indicator variables denoting whether 
the employer is a private company, the job type (if managerial, skilled, armed forces etc), 
the contract type (full time, permanent); (ii) measures of (log transformed) real monthly 
earning and (log transformed) annual equivalized household net real income; and (iii) 
individual and household characteristics such as age in years, education level, household 
type (married couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether pays rent, own 
home etc). 
Table 2.3b: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in the brackets. *** p-
value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.10. In Columns 3 and 4, because the outcome 
variable refers to behavior “in the last two years” we used the lagged values of covariates, 
including for the instrument variable –number of employees in the workplace. Estimates 
include dummy variables indicating time (survey wave) effects. Alongside with the vector 
of indicator variables identifying the range of number of employees in the job place, other 
covariates included in the estimation were: (i) indicator variables denoting whether the 
worker is responsible for supervising, whether the job contract is of a full-time position; 
(ii) measures of individual  and household income; and (iii) individual and household 
characteristics such as gender, age in years, education level, household type (married 
couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether pays rent, own home etc).  
Table 2.4: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in the brackets. *** p-
value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.10. All estimates include within subjects fixed-
effects and dummy variables indicating time (survey wave) effects. Alongside with the 
vector of indicator variables identifying the range of number of employees in the job place, 
other covariates included in the estimation were: (i) indicator variables denoting whether 
the employer is a private company, the job type (if managerial, skilled, armed forces etc), 
the contract type (full time, permanent); (ii) measures of (log transformed) real monthly 
earning and (log transformed) annual equivalized household net real income; and (iii) 
individual and household characteristics such as age in years, education level, household 
type (married couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether pays rent, own 
home etc). 
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Table 2.5: Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level shown in the brackets. 
*** p-value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.10. Because the outcome variable refers 
to behavior “in the last two years” we used the lagged values of covariates, including for 
the instrument variable –number of employees in the workplace. Estimates include dummy 
variables indicating time (survey wave) effects. Alongside with the vector of indicator 
variables identifying the range of number of employees in the job place, other covariates 
included in the estimation were: (i) indicator variables denoting whether the worker is 
responsible for supervising, whether the job contract is of a full-time position; (ii) 
measures of individual  and household income; and (iii) individual and household 
characteristics such as gender, age in years, education level, household type (married 
couple, dependent children etc), household tenure (whether pays rent, own home etc). 
 
Chapter 3 
Table 3.1: Standard errors are shown in the brackets; Columns 1-2 show average 
housework levels of those individuals that entered retirement in baseline and follow-up 
periods, while column 3 shows the corresponding average change in housework; columns 
4-5 show average housework levels of those who stayed in the labour market, while 
column 6 shows the corresponding average change in housework. 
Table 3.2: The table provides the ratio of respondents indicating that his/her partner does 
most of the indicated household jobs or it is done by paid help/other in the baseline and 
follow-up period. The BHPS asks couples the following question: Could you please say 
who mostly does this work here? Is it mostly yourself, or mostly your spouse/partner, or is 
the work shared equally. The possible responses are: 1 – mostly self, 2 – mostly 
spouse/partner, 3 – shared, 4 - paid help only, 5 – other (specify). We created an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for responses “mostly spouse/partner” and “paid help only” to measure 
home division of the corresponding domestic activities: grocery shopping, cooking, 
cleaning/hovering, and washing/ironing. We excluded answers equal to 5 – other (specify); 
Standard error are shown in the brackets; The different between groups is reported in the 
last column, calculated as the difference between the average responses in the group that 
made a transition to retirement and the group that stayed in the labour market, both in the 
follow-up period; The estimated retirement effect on individual responses was tested 
against the null-hypothesis with a t-test; (v) * p< 10%, ** p< 5%, *** p<1%. 
98 
 
Table 3.3: Standard errors are shown in the brackets; Cohabiting couples (Demographics) 
indicates percentage of individuals living in households composed by cohabiting couples 
or partners, although in the analysis we included household type as a categorical variable 
describing nine household type; The sample has a negligible percentage of unemployed 
individuals, so we omitted this information; Household log equivalised household income 
was obtained by dividing household annual income variable by the household equivalence 
scale before housing costs (Taylor et al, 2010) present in the BHPS; Paying rent represents 
the percentage of individuals who pay rent, although in the analysis we included household 
tenure as a categorical variable describing eight scenarios, for example, household is 
owned outright, owned with mortgage, and rented from private and furnished. 
Table 3.4: Heteroscedasticy-robust standard errors clustered by individuals are shown in 
the brackets; The table present the estimates of the effect of a transition to retirement on 
the time devoted by individuals to housework tasks in a week. This is equivalent to the 
marginal effect of S_it from Equation 11, also described as the parameter  δ from 
Equations 11 and 14. For further information about the covariates, see Table 3. 
Table 3.5: Standard errors shown in the brackets; In order to obtain individuals’ propensity 
scores, we first ran a probit model with  𝑆𝑖𝑡  as dependent variable to estimate the 
likelihood of a given individual to enter retirement in the follow-up period conditional on 
covariates observed in the baseline period: total household housework hours, gender, age, 
age2, whether cohabits with spouse or partner, whether has a full-time job, household log 
equivalised income, household tenure, educational level, and reported health in the last 
twelve months. The model also controlled for the five personality traits, wave and 
geographical region; Probit model’s pseudo R-squared = 0.133 and the average probability 
of entering retirement within the sample (N = 3,650) is 0.089 with standard deviation of 
0.086; Exact match was applied on wave and on those covariates with large biases 
evidenced in the descriptive statistics (Table 3): cohabiting couple, full-time job in the 
baseline period and gender; Column 1 shows the OLS estimate from Table 4, column 6, as 
a comparison. Columns 2-5 show the estimates of the effect of a transition to retirement on 
the time devoted by individuals to housework tasks in a week. This is equivalent to the 
parameter 𝛿 from Equations 11 and 14; The number of observations presented in columns 
2-5 represent the sample respecting the requirement of common support, i.e., the 
occurrence of an overlapping propensity score in both groups indicated by S; The standard 
errors reported in columns 2-5 correspond only to the matching estimation’s sample size 
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and variance, do not take into account the error from the propensity scores previously 
estimated. 
Table 3.6: Heteroscedasticy-robust standard errors clustered by individuals are shown in 
the brackets. In order to adjust for the multiple comparisons being performed, significance 
levels were calculated following the Holm-Bonferroni methodology (Holm, 1979); The 
table present the estimates of the marginal effect of each non-cognitive skill on housework 
change conditional on the occurrence of a transition to retirement or permanence in the 
labour market. This is equivalent to the marginal effect of θ𝑖 from Equations 12 and 13, 
respectively, also described as the parameter  ρ in the same equations; We assessed the 
robustness of the conditional marginal effects of personality traits’ results by controlling 
also for the potential effects of pre-retirement household and individual characteristics 
observed contemporaneously to non-cognitive skills. Considering that there are a number 
of factors that may correlate with an individual’s personality that they could act as 
potential confounds or mediators we included covariates observed in wave 15 such as 
household size, whether the individual cohabits with a spouse or partner, education and job 
status. 
Table 3.7: Heteroscedasticy-robust standard errors clustered by individuals are shown in 
the brackets. In order to adjust for the multiple comparisons being performed, significance 
levels were calculated following the Holm-Bonferroni methodology (Holm, 1979); The 
table present the estimates of the marginal effect of each non-cognitive skill on housework 
levels, reported monthly leisure and eating out individual expenditures (scale 0-12) and 
reported weekly household grocery and food bill (scale 1-12) conditional on the occurrence 
of a transition to retirement or permanence in the labour market. 
Table 3.8: Heteroscedasticy-robust standard errors clustered by individuals are shown in 
the brackets; As from the results in Table 6 and 7, here we also included covariates 
observed in wave 15 such as household size, whether the individual cohabits with a spouse 
or partner, education and job status. For further information about the other covariates, see 
Table 3; the table present the estimates of the effect of a transition to retirement on the time 
devoted by individuals to housework tasks in a week. This is equivalent to the marginal 
effect of Sit from Equation 11, also described as the parameter  δ from Equations 11 and 
14, conditional on gender (men and women), household type, job type and standardised 
extraversion scores equal to one standard deviation above and below the mean. 
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